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Chapter 1
Rationale for the Study of Civilian Protection:

Civilians are noncombatants who by definition, are not on active duty in the
armed services, nor on a police or firefighting force. Yet civilians often shoulder the
brunt and brutality of armed conflict around the globe. Throughout the past century,
measures have evolved to better protect civilians from physical harm during conflict,
each met with varying degrees of success and failure. One of the more recent
developments in civilian protection is the norm known as the “responsibility to protect,”
which simply put, affirms the international community’s right to protect civilians when a
nation state cannot or will not do so itself. Civilian groups, that is, civil society, were
instrumental in developing this concept, which arose from a very public debate regarding
the failure to protect civilians in both Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s.
There is evidence that civilians involved in armed conflict today are dying in
smaller numbers than in earlier times. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program reports that
“the average battle-death toll per conflict [involving a state] in the 1950s was almost
10,000, while the equivalent figure for the new millennium has been less than 1,000.
These estimates leave no doubt that there has been a huge decline in the deadliness of
warfare since the 1950s.” 1 This measurable progress towards a decline in civilian death
is a welcome development. However, multiple instances of armed conflict remain where
civilians are still not sufficiently protected, and the majority of these conflicts involve a
1

Human Security Report Project, Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the
Shrinking Costs of War (New York:Oxford University Press, 2011) 166.
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non-state actor. In this thesis, I argue that conflict involving an armed non-state actor
(ANSA) is fundamentally different from traditional interstate conflict in so far as the
methodology of civilian protection is concerned. Therefore, for the norm of civilian
protection to be appropriately expanded to include ANSA conflicts, it is imperative that
civil society actors, who have greater access and fewer negotiating constraints than states,
be treated as partners in the process of norm expansion.
The loss of civilian life in armed conflict is widely condemned. However, there
are organized armed groups, both state and non-state actors, which rationalize civilian
death in terms of the end justifying the means. Although in most societies there is a
cultural taboo against involving non-combatants in warfare, these groups believe their
objective is so unique, so imperative, so “justified,” that civilian harm is warranted and
defensible to achieve their end. For example, the carpet bombing of Dresden in World
War II and the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed tens of thousands of
civilians, but both were justified by state actors as a necessary means to end the world
war. Similarly, the kidnapping and death of Israeli athletes during the 1972 Olympics
were justified by the group Black September as a necessary means to obtain the release of
Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. Illustrations such as these demonstrate how any
group, state or non-state, can characterize their purpose as the exception to the rule
against civilian harm.
As will be shown, the norm of civilian protection has evolved since the 1950s.
There have been two positive trends concerning civilian death. First, the civilian
protection norm has become embedded in the international consciousness of decision
makers when the armed conflict involves state actors. Second, civilian death is actually
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decreasing when an armed conflict involves state actors only. One can correctly
hypothesize that the two trends are related. Over time, the more the norm against physical
harm became embedded, the less physical harm to civilians occurred. There is a different
outcome, however, when the actors involved in the armed conflict are no longer two or
more states only, but include an additional party: a non-state actor. Civilians are better
protected from physical harm when the conflict involves solely state actors. Civilians are
less protected when the conflict involves non-state actors.
When a conflict involves the state, civilian death is not sanctioned, but often it is
permissible or understood as a regrettable outcome. States have codified their
prohibitions against civilian death to include exceptions. Just war theory holds that
civilians may not be targeted, but there is an intrinsic understanding that conflict involves
unintentional harm. “Smart” bombs are designed and marketed to hit an intended target,
with the implied acceptance that no bomb is ever one hundred percent accurate. The
Geneva Conventions of 1949 (to which the vast majority of states are signatories) affirm
that civilians must not be subject to attack. They do not, however, address the issue of
accountability when civilians are inadvertently harmed. In practice, history has
demonstrated near impunity for a state when it claims a legitimate target was intended but
regretfully, civilian death occurred. Examples include: the United States’ use of drones in
Afghanistan; Israel’s “Operation Cast Lead” in Gaza for three weeks in 2008/2009 with
Israel’s stated goal of halting rocket fire launched by Palestinians in the Gaza strip; and
the NATO bombings in 1999 as part of Operation Allied Force that led to the withdrawal
of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo, and ended the wars in Yugoslavia of the 1990s. All of
these are instances when a state, or group of states in the case of NATO, used lethal force
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against a non-state actor and killed civilians. To date, there have been no legal
consequences against any of the states involved.
Conversely, when one party to the conflict is a non-state actor, civilian death is
never legally sanctioned nor permissible. Several historical events highlight this theory,
the attacks on the United States on September 11th, 2001 being one of the most
infamous. Although Osama Bin Laden, as head of the non-state group Al Qaeda had
declared war on the United States in 1998, the attacks on the Pentagon (a United States
military installation), and the thwarted attacks on the U.S. Capitol (a government
building), were seen as non-legitimate and labeled terrorism. Armed attacks by other nonstate actors against a state have been similarly categorized: the Tamil Tigers against Sri
Lankan forces; the Irish Republican Army against British soldiers; Chechen militants
against Russian forces; and the Lord’s Resistance Army against multiple state armed
forces. Table 1:1 highlights the differences in perception of civilian death.

Table 1:1 Difference between Civilian Harm Caused by
State or Non-state Entity
ACTOR
State

Non-state

Not sanctioned; but permissible
Characteristics
of
Decreasing
Civilian Harm
Constrained by norms, laws, moral
obligations that have become
institutionalized

6

Not sanctioned; not
permissible
Not decreasing
Not bound by the usual
institutions; need other
constraints

It is imperative to categorize behavior causing civilian death as either lawful or
unlawful, regardless of identity of the causative agent. The actor responsible for civilian
death must be held accountable whether state or non-state. However, more needs to be
done to protect civilians from non-state actors. The decade of relative peace after the
violence of the twentieth century should not reassure us that similar destruction could not
occur in the twenty first century. The study and implementation of measures that
effectively helped protect civilians from state harm can help inform measures to protect
civilians from harm caused by non-state actors. In chapter two I will elaborate my
research design.
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Chapter 2
Research Design

In this thesis, I hypothesize that unless civil society is treated by states (and
international state-based organizations such as the United Nations) as partners in the
process of norm expansion, civilian protection in cases involving armed non-state armed
actors (ANSAs) will remain inadequate. I maintain that civil society can play a crucial
role in influencing the behavior of non-state actors because civil society has greater
access and fewer negotiating constraints than traditional state mediators.
First, concerning access: civil society often operates “on the ground” and within
the communities affected by an armed conflict. Members have a stake in the outcome,
and with strategic planning, can build trust with an ANSA in ways a state may not be
capable of. Second, concerning negotiating constraints: civil society is not bound by the
same legal treaties nor public image constraints as a state or international state-based
organization. Whereas a statement such as “we do not negotiate with terrorists” may be
part of a state’s strategy, civil society groups such as a non-governmental organization
(NGO), may not have the same restrictions when negotiating. According to Claudia
Hofman, who has studied the strengths (and weaknesses) of NGOs involved in armed
conflict, the flexibility of NGOs is another asset. NGOs are often small in size, and able
to respond more quickly to the rapid change in circumstance so often displayed in any
conflict. They do not have the multi-layered bureaucracy found within states or large
international organizations (IOs). “The small network form of organization appears to be
an advantage as it avoids the feedback loop entailed by a larger hierarchical organization,
8

resulting in lengthy periods of coordination before being able to proceed in
communication or mediation processes with armed actors.” 3 Timeliness and responsive
contact is imperative in conflict resolution, and flexibility decreases constraints to keep
positive momentum moving forward.
There is reliable data to now prove that civilian death has markedly decreased
since the end of the Cold War, which signaled a decline in both declared war between
two states, and undeclared war between the superpower proxies.4 Civil society played a
norm entrepreneur role in the formation of this civilian protection norm among states. My
hypothesis envisions an even larger role for civil society in embedding a civilian
protection norm within the behavior of non-state actors as well.

Methodology:
I have chosen to carefully examine three historical conflicts between a state and
non-state actors to see whether civil society played a role, and if so, whether their
activities helped protect civilians. The cases will inform my hypothesis that unless civil
society is treated by states and international organizations as partners in the process of
norm creation, civilian protection involving non-state armed groups will remain
inadequate.
The three selected examples of armed conflict involving both a state and a nonstate actor are:


The state of Uganda vs. the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)

3

Claudia Hofman, Reasoning with Rebels. Research Paper, German Institute for International and Security
Affiars (Berlin: 2012), 20.
4
Erik Melander, Magnus Oberg, and Jonathan Hall, "Are 'New Wars' More Atrocious? Battle Severity,
Civilians Killed and Forced Migration Before and After the Cold War." European Journal of International
Relations (2009), as referenced in Theo Farrell and Olivier Schmidt, “The Causes, Character and Conduct of
Armed Conflict, and Its Effect on Civilian Populations, 1990-2010.” Legal and Protection Policy Series
(2012): 8.
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The Republic of the Philippines vs. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)



The state of Libya vs. the National Transitional Council (NTC)
Three geographic locations are specifically represented: North Africa, Central

Africa, and Southeast Asia. All three conflicts highlight a particular influence of civil
society or a non-governmental organization in creating and/or reinforcing the norm of
civilian protection in a non-state actor. In each of the three cases, the following questions
are asked:
1.

Have civilians been harmed and how much so? I will use statistics

on civilian death (discussed below).
2.

Was civil society involved and to what degree? What was their

role? Here I discuss the work of civil society/NGOs and how it affected civilian
protection.
3.

Did the role of civil society contribute to decreased civilian death?

Did it help protect civilians?
I posit that the more civil society participated, the greater the reduction in civilian
harm. Of note, two of the three conflicts have religious overtones; one is clearly grounded
in Christian / Muslim hostility (the Philippines); one in declared religious fanaticism (in
Uganda, but whether the Lord’s Resistance Army is strictly fighting on behalf of
religious beliefs is widely questioned). This is interesting because civil society groups
often challenge the belief system, including religious ideology, of non-state actors in
order to influence their behavior and reduce civilian casualties.
In only one conflict is the state overwhelmingly viewed as the protagonist –
Uganda. In the conflict in the Philippines, the state is often portrayed as the protagonist,
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but certain subsets of the global population are largely sympathetic to the cause of the
ANSA, leading to interesting corollary concepts about civilian protection. Lastly, Libya
represents a conflict where the state was viewed as the pariah (specifically its head of
state - Colonel Qaddafi.5) This case study is remarkable because a sector within civil
society emerged as the armed non-state actor. Further, as an ANSA, it was the National
Transitional Council that was able to garner the support of the international community,
not the state of Libya. Given the advent of the Arab Spring, and recent events in the
North Africa - Middle East region, it is important to examine how groups within civil
society mutate to become ANSAs, how they obtain positive recognition from the
international community, and whether their origins within the civil sector influence rates
of civilian death during ensuing conflict.
It is worth mentioning that the terms “terrorism” and “terrorist” have been voiced
publicly during all three conflicts, with all three official heads of state describing the nonstate actor in each conflict as “terrorist.” Several Filipino presidents labeled the MILF a
terrorist organization; the Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni, as well as the African
Union, declared the LRA a terrorist group; and Qaddafi, the head of state in Libya,
initially branded the civil unrest as terrorist. The issue is relevant because the label
“terrorist” affects how civil society groups can interact with a non-state actor. One
example is the Parents Circle, a group of Israeli and Palestinian relatives who have all
lost loved ones to the conflict in the Middle East. In 2008, they were denied permission
by Israel to teach classroom presentations about non-violence in the occupied territories
5

I have chosen to use the spelling “Qaddafi” for the former Libyan head of state’s last name. There is no
exact transliteration from Arabic, and no consensus exists among news sources as to the English spelling.
See Eoin O'Carroll, "Gaddafi? Kadafi? Qaddafi? What's the Correct Spelling?" Christian Science Monitor
(2011), accessed December 10, 2014, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/2011/0222/Gaddafi-KadafiQaddafi-What-s-the-correct-spelling
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because Hamas was then in power and had been classified as a terrorist organization.
Consequently, NGOs such as the Parents Circle were not permitted by law to interact
with Hamas, even when the interaction was solely to gain permission for their
presentations. Restrictions on access to, or dialogue with, an ANSA is an increasing
concern among NGOs seeking to influence ANSA behavior towards more robust civilian
protection.

Definitions:
Before proceeding, I will clarify some important terms.
According to John Keane, civil society “describes and anticipates a complex and
dynamic ensemble of legally protected nongovernmental institutions that tend to be
nonviolent, self-organizing, self-reflexive, and permanently in tension, both with each
other and with the governmental institutions that ‘frame,’ constrict and enable their
activities.” 6 Varshney adds that “informal group activities as well as ascriptive
associations should be considered part of civil society as long as they connect individuals,
build trust, encourage reciprocity and facilitate exchange of views on matters of public
concern – economic, political, cultural and social.” 7 To be succinct, I define civil society
as any group with a common interest that does not formally, or informally represent a
state. Some examples of civil society include religious groups (the Catholic church);
unions and trade organizations (the International Air Transport Association); nongovernmental organizations (the International Rescue Committee); business groups
(Chambers of Commerce), and epistemic communities which can influence collective
6

John Keane, Civil Society, Definitions and Approaches (2009): 1. http://johnkeane.net/wpcontent/uploads/2011/01/jk_civil_sciety_definitions_encyclopedia.pdf
7
Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (New Delhi: Oxford
Uiversity Press, 2002), 46.
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opinion, such as scholars, scientists, and editorial boards of major news outlets. I will use
the term civil society when there are multiple entities involved. I will use the term nongovernmental organization (NGO), or international non-governmental organization
(INGO) when a singular group within civil society is the influential entity. State based
international organizations such as the United Nations or the African Union are not
included under the rubric of civil society.
In this thesis, I refer to the civilian protection regime. In the context of
international relations, a regime is a “set of explicit or implicit principles, norms, rules,
and decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given
issue-area.” 8 Therefore, I define a civilian protection regime as a system with a tripartite
foundation:
•

laws (including treaties and conventions)

•

norms; and

•

ethics (including religious sanction),

which, when combined with actors and organizations, serve to protect civilians from
physical harm.
The principle known as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a newer term and a
useful example of a norm that has emerged from the civilian protection regime. The
Responsibility to Protect developed as the global community’s remorseful response to the
failures of civilian protection in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s. The basic
presumption of R2P is that the state has the primary responsibility to protect its citizens.
Should the state fail in this responsibility, and/or be the actual perpetrator of harm, the

8

Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” in
International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca, Cornell University Press: 1983), 1

13

international community then has the right to intervene and protect civilians. 9 More
than a decade has now passed since R2P gained formal recognition. Although there is
wide consensus regarding the responsibility to protect in theory, the timing of its practice
and implementation are widely disputed.
Another important term to clarify is civilian harm. There are many kinds of harm
and trauma caused by exposure to armed conflict. Psychological, cognitive and sexual
degradations of physical health all deserve attention, but this thesis will use civilian
deaths as a measurable outcome primarily because death is more readily and reliably
quantified than other types of physical harm. However, even the term civilian casualty or
civilian death can lead to fierce debate.
Accurate assessment of civilian casualties is an important component of the
civilian protection regime. Who counts as a civilian, and when? Recent scholarly work
has seriously questioned the oft quoted conventional wisdom that 90 percent of victims
from armed conflict are civilian. 10 Disputes over body counts have often produced fierce
political debate between the actors involved in armed conflict. The discussion is difficult
and emotive. Certainly, there are instances when civilians are deliberately targeted. There
are just as surely times when civilian death is unintentional. Soldiers who are themselves
in harm’s way are asked to react under conditions of severe stress. Politics aside, the
issue of how many civilians were killed in any conflict is paramount when it comes to
helping policy makers design protocols and guidelines, both to help guide soldiers’
actions, and to protect civilians.

9

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, (Ottowa:
International Development Research Centre: 2001)
10

Adam Roberts, "Lives and Statistics: Are 90% of War Victims Civilian?" Survival 52 (2010): 115-136.
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One example is the 2003 U.S. - Iraq conflict. There have been several studies by
NGOs, researchers, and government officials attempting to quantify excess civilian death
since the U.S. led invasion. One such survey compared mortality rates fifteen months
prior to the United States-led invasion, with eighteen months after. Researchers
concluded: 1.) that there were more than 100,000 “excess” deaths, primarily from
violence; 2.) most violent deaths were caused by airstrikes from coalition forces; and 3.)
the collection of public health data is possible even during violent, armed conflict. 11 The
conclusions were published in 2004 and caused quite a stir, and bolstered the arguments
of anti-war factions around the world. Detractors alleged that the study was released
prematurely to sway public opinion regarding the American presidential elections which
were then upcoming. The ensuing debate further noted that when it was the victim of
political violence on September 11, 2001, the United States knew the exact number of
civilian casualties: 2,973. Yet when it was the perpetrator of sanctioned violence, the
United States did not have accurate counts of civilian casualties in either Iraq, or
Afghanistan. The authors rightly pointed out therefore, that since more than half of the
reported dead in Iraq were women and children, “it seems difficult to understand how a
military force could monitor the extent to which civilians are protected against violence
without systematically doing body counts or at least looking at the kinds of casualties
they induce.” 12 Further, the Geneva Conventions mandate that an occupying army has
direct responsibility for the civilian population they control.
Other studies attempting to quantify civilian deaths in Iraq have used the method of
household interviews, as there was no central Iraq death registry (a common problem
11

Les Roberts, "Mortality Before and After the Invasion of Iraq: Cluster Sample Survey." The Lancet
(2004): 1857.
12
Ibid, 1863.
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during any armed conflict). The studies vary widely in their count, ranging from 128,000
to 1,033,000 excess Iraqi civilian deaths from March 2003 through 2004. That is a
discrepancy of nearly 900,000 lives – no small disparity. 13 The difference in numbers is
of vital importance, primarily because each number represents a human being, but also
because statistics are quoted by those with political agendas. Those supporting the Iraq
invasion could quote the lower figures; those against the invasion could point to a civilian
death toll of over one million. Data therefore do matter, and data need to be reliable,
politically blind, and factually based. If societies have any hope of ever decreasing
civilian harm, it is important to know which military and peacekeeping strategies are
effective in protecting civilians, and which are not – and that information must come
from objective, reliable data. For this thesis, I have chosen to use data from the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program (UCDP), an internationally recognized research institution housed
in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University. The Uppsala
Conflict Data Program has been gathering information on violent conflicts since the
1970s. “The data provided is one of the most accurate and well-used data-sources on
global armed conflicts and its definition of armed conflict is becoming a standard in how
conflicts are systematically defined and studied… The ambition of a systematic data
collection means that the coding rules are very strict, and that the standards are set very
high for inclusion of information.” 14 As defined by the UCDP, an armed conflict is a
contested incompatibility where the use of armed force between two parties results in at
least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year. Battle-related deaths are fatalities that
13

Maria Karagiozakis, "Counting Excess Civilian Casualties of the Iraq War: Science or Politics?" Journal of
Humanitarian Assistance (2009): http://jha.ac/2009/06/22/counting-excess-civilian-casualties-of-the-iraqwar-science-or-politics/.
14
“About Us,” Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research, last modified December 12,
2014, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/program_overview/about_ucdp/
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can be related to combat in a conflict dyad. “This includes traditional battlefield fighting,
guerrilla activities (e.g. hit-and-run attacks / ambushes) and all kinds of bombardments of
military units, cities and villages etc. The targets are usually the military itself and its
installations, or state institutions and state representatives, but there is often substantial
collateral damage in the form of civilians killed in crossfire, indiscriminate bombings etc.
All deaths - military as well as civilian - incurred in such situations, are counted as battlerelated deaths.” 15

Theoretical Framework:
The act of protecting civilians, often termed international humanitarian
intervention, is not itself a new phenomenon. Some of the initial Christian thought about
protection of civilians can be attributed to the just war tradition, credited primarily to St.
Augustine of Hippo who wrote in the fourth century AD. There are two specific facets of
just war theory: jus ad bellum (qualifications necessary before participating in a war) and
jus in bello (right conduct once a war has begun). The three criteria of jus in bello are:
proportionality, minimum force and distinction. Although all three provide some
guidance regarding civilian safety, it is the principle of distinction which mandates that
all warring parties distinguish between combatants and noncombatants. 16 “Many of the
rules developed by the just war tradition have since been codified into contemporary
international laws governing armed conflict. The just war tradition has thus been doubly
influential, dominating both moral and legal discourse surrounding armed conflict.” 17

15

For definitions of all terms used by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, see
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/
16
International Commitee of the Red Cross "Distinction: Protecting Civilians in Armed Conflict." icrc.org.
Accessed December 2, 2009. http://icrc.org/web/eng/siteen0.nsf/htmlall/p0904?opendocument.
17
Brian Orend, "Michael Walzer on Resorting to Force." Canadian Journal of Political Science 33
(2000):524.
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Islamic law has also made important contributions regarding civilian protection.
One of its most eminent scholars, Muhammad al Shaybani, wrote Introduction to the Law
of Nations in the 8th century. It became an authoritative text on international law (‘siyar’
in Arabic) and precipitated further Islamic thinking on the subject. Al Shaybani’s
teachings cover issues such as conduct during war, treatment of “protected” peoples, the
question of when fighting is justified, and the treatment of prisoners. 18
Several individuals further contributed to the growing norm of civilian
protection. Hugo Grotius, often considered the father of international law, was a 17th
century Dutch scholar and statesman who wrote On the Laws of War and Peace. In Book
III, Chapter 11 of his treatise, entitled The Right of Killing Enemies, in Just War, to be
Tempered With Moderation and Humanity, he necessitates, “every possible requisite
precaution to spare the innocent, especially women, children and the aged.” 19 Grotius
was writing his most important work during the Thirty Years War, which eventually
ended with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and gave birth to what is now recognized as
the modern nation-state.
Anarchy best describes the current world order of nation/states. When war occurs,
there is no one overarching entity that has the power or the authority to command a stop
to violence. Realism as a theoretical framework acknowledges that civilians die as the
inevitable outcome of armed conflict. The harm may not be intentional, but a stark reality
exists that the security of the state may at times outweigh the security of its citizens.
Liberalism also sees civilian harm as an unavoidable consequence of armed conflict.
Liberalism promotes institutions and legal structures through which nation states are able

18
19

John Kelsay, "Al-Shaybani and the Islamic Art of War." Journal of Military Ethics (2003):63-75
Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, trans. A.C. Campbell (London:1814)
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to cooperate to help protect civilians, but the power to participate within these institutions
remains with the state.
There exists a valid argument that neither theoretical framework fully explains the
near universal recognition of the need to protect civilians, and the all-too-often failure to
do so effectively. Additionally, both frameworks have great difficulty rationalizing why a
state would protect anyone other than a state’s own citizens. Prior to the twentieth
century, this phenomena was seen rarely, and employed almost exclusively to protect
Christians from the Ottoman Turks.20 Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative of
protecting civilians as an end in itself had not yet taken hold within the global conscience.
Kant produced most of his philosophical work in the late eighteenth century. Yet the
“duty” to protect others would take another two hundred years to become the formalized
principle we know today as “humanitarian intervention.”
Constructivism has added to liberalism in a way that enhances our understanding
of civilian protection. Liberalism supports the extension of human rights principles to
everyone, regardless of personal connection or membership within a particular
“community”. Constructivism uses the building blocks of liberal thinking: institutions,
regimes, and laws; and supplements them with norm theory to better house civilian
protection concepts.
Alexander Wendt, a noted proponent of constructionism, identified two of its
basic tenets: "that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared
ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors

20

Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention." in Conflict After the Cold War,
ed. Richard K. Betts, (New York: Pearson, 2008), 238.
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are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature." 21 Essentially, a
constructivist might challenge the ideas of state sovereignty, or an individual’s
nationality, or civilians being afforded special protection. A constructivist makes the
distinction between our human reality which stems from the natural world, and that
which has been constructed by humankind. For example, that humans require oxygen to
live is a natural law. It is not a natural law however, but a social definition constructed by
humans, to label someone as Brazilian if they were born in Rio de Janeiro. National
boundaries are solely a human construct.
Social constructs and norms have the ability to change throughout the years, often
in the name of progress. Behavior once viewed as acceptable can be deemed immoral or
illegal decades later. The passage of time has seen the near abolishment of slavery,
marked decrease in child labor, and the beginnings of genuine equality for women – to
give a few examples of changes in societal norms. Constructivism has consequently
become a valid theoretical framework within international relations; one which is able to
elucidate political events from a more normative perspective than liberalism. One such
event is the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Dominant
international relations theory could not explain this monumental moment in history.
Realism could not account for the intentional Soviet relinquishment of state power.
Further, the institutions and cooperation so central to liberalism had little if anything to
do with the fall of the Soviet bloc. A constructivist approach however could explain these
epic events; modern realities could no longer support a state [a human construct] whose
social structure was embedded in totalitarianism, dismissive of ethnic differences, and

21

Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999),

1.
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economically chained to an un-winnable arms race. Viewed similarly, civilian protection
is also primarily a social construct. Nature does not dictate who is killed and who is
spared during armed conflict. Society does.
One aspect of constructivism is norm theory. Since my research focuses on the
norm of civilian protection, a close look at the development of norm theory is essential.
The decades of the 1960s and 1970s heralded social tumult, not only within society, but
within international relations as well. The Cold War was raging, and decolonization was
having a domino effect. Indigenous societies on the African continent were dismantling
colonial power structures and forming their own nation states. Political scientists
followed the field of economics in the hunt for hard data to predict events and change.22
Consequently, empirical research became the gold standard of theory not only within the
social sciences – but within its offspring - international relations. However, as any
professional in the field of psychology or behavioral studies can attest to, human behavior
has yet to be reduced to singular cause and effect rationalization for any individual, let
alone a society/state.
Constructivist researchers injected a social component into international relations
theorizing. One group elucidated norm theory and subsequently sought to prove the
validity of norm theory using hypotheses which could be tested and measured
empirically. In 1998, Finnemore and Sikkink postulated their unique theory of norm
development and claimed that “norm researchers have made inroads precisely because
they have been able to provide explanations substantiated by evidence.” 23 They

22

Theodore Lowi, "The State in Political Science: How We Become What We Study," The American
Political Science Review 86 (1992):1-7.
23
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,"
International Organization (1998): 890.
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described the three stages of the norm “life cycle”: norm emergence, norm cascade, and
internalization. (see Table 2:1)

Table 2:1 Stages of Norms
Stage 1
Norm emergence
Norm entrepreneurs
with professional
organizations

Stage 2
Stage 3
Norm cascade
Internalization
States, international
Law, professions,
organizations,
bureaucracy
networks

Altruism, empathy,
ideational,
commitment

Legitimacy,
reputation, esteem

Persuasion

24

Socialization,
institutionalization,
demonstration

Conformity

Institutionalization

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, (1998): 898

Norm emergence describes the first stage, when “norm entrepreneurs” use their
personal agency to promote political behavior change. “Framing” an issue, now common
parlance, was considered novel when introduced by David Snow in the 1980s.25 Framing
is a new way of describing an activity whereby norm entrepreneurs educate the elite and
societal leaders to new ways of viewing an issue. Consider the fairly recent norm of
nuclear abolition. The No Nukes coalition formed in the 1980s and was an attempt by
concerned norm entrepreneurs to influence policy makers by warning of the fatal end
game of nuclear war. Where once the power of atomic weapons had been viewed as
prohibitive security, the No Nukes model re-framed the issue by highlighting the
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insecurity caused by nuclear weapons. A new norm emerged, and the general public was
educated to the potential annihilation inherent in nuclear weapons. However, the norm of
nuclear abolition never truly reached the “tipping point” wherein, according to Finnemore
and Sikkink, at least one third of available actors sign on to the new norm. Hence, nuclear
arsenals remain around the globe.
The second stage, termed norm cascade, occurs when a critical number of states
reach the tipping point and begin to adhere to the new norm. Finnemore and Sikkink note
this generally happens after one third of actors align their behavior with the new norm, a
form of state “group think.” A cascade then occurs, with new states signing on relatively
quickly.
Lastly, stage 3 is norm internalization. At this stage, the norm has become so
embedded, its legitimacy is assumed and a tacit understanding of expected behavior
exists. An example here would be the prohibition of slavery in the 21st century. With rare
exception, and certainly on a state level, human slavery has been abolished as a state
practice.
Finnemore and Sikkink further argue that “world time-context” matters in the
development of a norm, meaning that norms are not independent of global historical
events. To illustrate this point, consider the new social construct that evolved in the 1990s
precisely because of two global events; the genocide in both Rwanda and Srebrenica.
Kofi Annan, Director of Peacekeeping Operations at the United Nations (UN) at the time
of the genocides, was haunted by the mass killing. Later as Secretary-General, he asked
for a new approach as UN protection of civilians in both these instances was a
catastrophic failure. From this request, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was developed
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as a new social construct. Should the state fail in the responsibility of protecting its
citizens, and/or be the actual perpetrator of harm, the international community then has
the right to intervene. R2P takes away state power, and gives power to the international
community – not in the interest of the international community, nor one individual state,
but in the interest of individual human beings at risk for harm. This was an entirely new
construct.
R2P, while a concept that is maturing, still has serious flaws primarily stemming
from “rules” concerning the UN Security Council (SC) and the veto power of specific
states. The majority of the international community can agree on the need to intervene
and protect civilians (Libya in 2011 and Syria 2012 for example), but any one of the five
permanent members of the SC still has the power to block a vote leading to concrete
action. This is an example of a new construct (R2P) inhibited by the old order (Security
Council veto), and a frustration encapsulated in the words of Rajan Menon:
The source of this failure is neither a lack of people of goodwill nor a
surfeit of callousness. Rather, it is the persistence of an international order
centered on instrumental connectivity rather than the primacy of universal
obligations that permits sovereign states—willful, protective of their
freedom of action, and suspicious of supranationalism and binding
commitments—to negate or enfeeble collective action, even in the face of
epic cruelty. 27
Civilian protection emerged as a broadly understood norm among states after the
World Wars of the twentieth century. Millions of civilians were killed, and the numbers
increase exponentially when counting those injured and displaced. Indeed, as a response
to this global indifference between soldier and civilian, the preamble of the Charter of the
27
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United Nations reads: “we the people of the United Nations [are] determined to save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought
untold sorrow to mankind,” 33 A norm cascade occurred in 1949 with the ratification of
Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
Henceforth, any new member of the United Nations was effectively signing on to the
notion of the protection of civilians during warfare. The ensuing half century saw the
internalization of this norm, both legally within what is now the specialty field of
International Law, and institutionally within international organizations such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross and Amnesty International, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like Human Rights Watch and Witness.
Thus, the norm of civilian protection has generally followed a typical norm life
cycle as outlined by Finnemore and Sikkink if one is referring to state behavior. Although
far from absolute, a norm exists to protect civilians during armed conflict between states.
There are two exceptions to this argument however. First, specific states, as with specific
individuals, deem themselves “exempt” from the norm, giving rise to the problem of a
non-conforming state. Second, states are not the only actors on the stage of armed
conflict. As I will discuss in depth in the next chapter, civilian protection when armed
non-state actors (ANSAs) are involved is more problematic than when a state actor is
involved. True, in the twentieth century, the enormous loss of civilian life was caused
specifically by states. However, information from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program
shows that by 2010 there were thirty active armed conflicts around the globe, in twenty
five locations, and none of these conflicts involved two or more states only; all involved

33

“Charter of the United Nations,” (1945): Preamble.

25

at least one non-state actor. 34 This fact makes clear the need to extend civilian protection
norms to include the behavior of non-state actors. But at present, the life cycle of the
norm of civilian protection by non-state actors is largely at stage 1 – the tipping point has
not been reached, there has been no norm cascade, and there is no broad internalization of
the norm within ANSA behavior.
I have established that the civilian protection norm that exists within state actors
is vastly different than that within non-state actors. A historical accounting is essential to
explain the disparity. It will inform my hypothesis about the necessary involvement of
civil society and international NGOs to better protect civilians during armed conflict
involving an ANSA.
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CHAPTER 3
Evolution of the Norm of Civilian Protection
Until the invention of gunpowder, conflict was conducted primarily by hand to
hand combat. Historically, the “smartest” of weapons may well be the sword, as the
intended recipient of its thrust was rarely an accidental victim. Gunpowder changed the
way wars were waged. With longer range weapons came a far greater potential for the
intended target to be missed – thereby increasing the chance of unintended harm to a
noncombatant.
Throughout history there have been attempts to modify warfare in order to
decrease human loss of life. Sun Tzu is considered one of the world’s greatest strategists
concerning warfare. His treatise, The Art of War, even though written in 6th century B.C.,
is required reading today at many military institutions. Tzu’s recommendations for the
conduct of war do not directly address the issue of civilian protection, but he does
counsel against attacking cities, or large population centers. “Thus, what is of supreme
importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy; next best is to disrupt his alliances;
the next best is to attack his army. The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only
when there is no alternative.” 35
Henri Dunant, a Swiss businessman, came to his concern about civilian casualties
almost accidentally. He was seeking water rights for a business opportunity in Algeria,
and decided to appeal directly to Napoleon. Inadvertently, Dunant stumbled upon one of
the deadliest conflicts of the 19th century, the battle for the Italian city Solferino. In 1862,
he published A Memory of Solferino, a book in three parts. The first and second describe
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the battle itself and its aftermath; “chaotic disorder, despair unspeakable, and misery of
every kind.” The third section outlines Dunant’s plan.
“The nations of the world should:


form relief societies to provide care for the wartime wounded;



each society should be sponsored by a governing board composed
of the nation's leading figures,



appeal to everyone to volunteer,



train these volunteers to aid the wounded on the battlefield and to
care for them later until they recovered.” 36

A committee, then conference was formed to explore the possibility of putting
Dunant’s plan into action. In 1864 twelve nations signed a treaty, called the Geneva
Convention, which allowed for the protection of medical personnel treating war wounded
through use of an emblem – a red cross on a white background. Thus began the
organization the Red Cross (known today as the International Committee of the Red
Cross). The global community did eventually recognize the importance of this specific
type of civilian protection by awarding Dunant (and an international pacifist, Frederic
Passy) the first Nobel Peace Prize in 1901. Neither man attended the ceremony, nor
delivered a lecture, and Dunant died a hermit in 1910. But most importantly, this 1864
Geneva Convention marks the first time nation states, together, agreed to modify the
conduct of war.
Unfortunately, with the advent of two world wars in the twentieth century, gains
made by the fledgling civilian protection regime were soon lost. By 1945 civilians had
36
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been slaughtered by the millions, exemplifying a near complete disregard for civilian
security by states. The Charter of the United Nations (UN) sought to incorporate lessons
learned by stating its determination “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow.” 37 Thus occurred formal
recognition that war no longer neatly complied with the distinction between combatant
and non-combatant, and in fact, the majority of persons killed during conflict in the first
half of the twentieth century were non-combatants.
Although expectations of normative state behavior were being written into the UN
Charter, it became necessary for the concept of civilian protection to become codified.
This happened with the Geneva Conventions in 1949. It is Convention IV – “Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War” that most clearly spells out
international law regarding civilian protection.
•

Civilians are not to be subject to attack

•

There is no destruction of property unless by military necessity

•

Individuals or groups must not be deported, regardless of motive

•

Civilians must not be used as hostages

•

Civilians must not be subject to outrages upon personal dignity

•

Civilians must not be tortured, raped or enslaved

•

Civilians must not be subject to collective punishment and

reprisals
•

Civilians must not receive differential treatment based on race,

religion, nationality, or political allegiance

37
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•

Warring parties must not use or develop biological or chemical

weapons and must not allow children under 15 to participate in hostilities or be
recruited into the armed forces

38

Physical harm to civilians certainly did not cease with the coming into force of
Convention IV. The global community would soon learn that conventions, declarations
and treaties meant little without the guarantee of punitive repercussions for offenders.
Although there are no exact estimates, the three year Korean War killed approximately
three million people. 39 The ten year war between Iraq and Iran throughout the 1980s
killed more than one million (primarily combatants), and like the Korean War, not an
inch of land was gained by either side. From 1950 through the 1980s, lethal wars
continued – the majority of the most deadly between states fighting by proxy during the
Cold War - or nascent states shrugging off their colonial oppressors in Africa. Regarding
the war in Indochina, “Vietnamese military and civilian deaths ranged from 1.5 million to
3.8 million, with the U.S.-led campaign in Cambodia resulting in 600,000 to 800,000
deaths, and Laotian war mortality estimated at about 1 million.” 40 Instability in Africa is
another cause of civilian death. Although declared interstate conflict on the continent is
rare, civil wars and intrastate conflict pose a real threat to civilians. There were more than
70 military coups and 13 presidential assassinations in Africa from 1960 through the
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1980s 41 – leading to volatile political situations and uncertainty over who exactly, or
what faction, had legitimate claim to the state’s right to use force.
Civilians in Central and South America were not spared the violence. Civil wars,
proxy wars, insurgencies and state violence all caused the death of thousands, if not
millions, of non-combatants in Guatemala, Chile, El Salvador, Argentina, Peru and
Nicaragua in the 1980s. There are no exact figures for civilian casualties. But perhaps a
phrase attributed to Stalin summarizes the indifference to civilian immunity best, “A
single death is a tragedy; a million deaths are a statistic.” 42
In the 1990s two major incidents of catastrophic loss of civilian life commanded
international attention. In 1994, the Rwandan genocide occurred. In the span of six
months, an estimated 800,000 Tutsis were killed,43 this in the age of near instant
communication and the ubiquitous global media. Further, the majority of deaths were not
caused by aerial bombardment, where one could reason that dropping bombs on large
population centers could quickly account for massive civilian casualties. The weapons of
the Rwandan genocide were primarily guns, machetes, and hate speech broadcast by
radio. The UN peacekeeping forces stationed in Rwanda (UNAMIR) were little more
than eyewitnesses, and even had the size of their force initially reduced, despite the
urgent warnings of their commanding officer, Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire. One
purported reason for inaction was because the Rwandan hostilities were viewed as an
internal conflict, and UN Security Council Resolution 872 (which established UNAMIR)
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was limited to peacekeeping. The UN therefore did not initially see justification for
sending more protective forces.
The second instance that weighed heavily on the collective global conscience was
the slaughter of 7,000 - 8,000 Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in Bosnia in July of
1995. The UN was held particularly responsible for not preventing this massacre because
the Security Council had declared Srebrenica a “safe area” in April 1993, and UN
protection forces were present within days of the mandate. Two years later, this small
protection unit was quickly overrun by Serbian military, who then murdered all able
bodied Muslim males.
Ultimately, these two failures provoked intense international discussion regarding
the concept of humanitarian intervention – armed intervention into another state, without
the agreement of that state, to address the threat or actual infliction of grave and large
scale violations of fundamental human rights.44 Civilian protection clearly failed in both
Rwanda and Srebrenica. Why? That question was ultimately put to the UN General
Assembly in 1999 by then Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan.
Consequently, an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was
created and issued its report entitled The Responsibility to Protect. The shift in focus
embodied in this document from the concept of state sovereignty to state responsibility
should not be underestimated. Before this report’s publication, the rights of the state were
viewed as preeminent. Now the emphasis was the rights of citizens, and the state’s
responsibility to protect those rights. After 450 years, the Westphalian tradition of state
sovereignty was being pushed to share its dominant role within international affairs.
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Rather than focusing on the safety of the state, the responsibility to protect contends that
the government’s primary duty is the safety of its citizens. “If the government is unable
or unwilling to fulfill that role, or if it itself is the perpetrator of massive human rights
crimes, then the responsibility devolves to the international community to act in its
place.” 45 This comes in the form of peacekeeping, or actions undertaken to protect the
peace. As events demonstrated in Libya in 2011, the international community’s resolve to
move from abstract responsibility to protect to concrete action has been, and will
continue to be tested.
The subsequent creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002
marked another momentous advance for the protection of civilians. Prior to the ICC,
international law lacked the enforcement ability to hold individuals accountable for the
most serious international crimes, including harm to civilians. Rather than establishing ad
hoc tribunals to continually respond to genocide, war crimes and crimes against
humanity, the international community created the ICC to be a standing court ready to
accept cases within its jurisdiction – with the ultimate goal of prevention. 46
Unfortunately, not all UN member states (including the United States) have ratified the
ICC, nor are there adequate personnel to investigate and apprehend suspects. But the ICC
is yet another tool outside of a singular state’s control that can potentially aid in the
prosecution of those who harm civilians.
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In May, 2009, the Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict was released to mark the 10th anniversary for
the protection of civilians as a thematic issue. Five core challenges were outlined:


enhancing compliance by parties to conflict with international law,

in particular in the conduct of hostilities;


enhancing compliance with the law by non-state armed groups;



enhancing protection through more effective and better resourced

peacekeeping and other relevant missions;


enhancing humanitarian access; and



enhancing accountability for violations of the law. 47

In this report UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon noted advances in the civilian
protection regime, but clearly stressed how much more progress must be made. He was
blunt in his criticism of both state and non-state actors in their disregard for civilian
populations, and frequently cited the situation in Gaza in late December 2008 as an
example.48 Ki-Moon noted not only the many incidences of direct civilian harm, but the
blatant restrictions put on access to humanitarian aid – which further exacerbated civilian
suffering. Lastly, he also called upon the Security Council (SC) to demand accountability
from all warring parties, and to use all legal means at their disposal to end impunity of
perpetrators. 49 The Secretary-General recognized an important shift in armed conflict
today. Most battles are no longer fought between two states. The majority of armed
47
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conflict occurring since the 1990s involves at least one non-state actor. It follows
therefore that if civilians are to be better protected, the international community must
hold non-state actors as accountable as states for their actions during warfare.

The Challenge of Armed Non-State Actors:
Armed non-state actors denote individuals or groups who do not
legitimately represent a nation/state. ANSAs are:
(i)

willing and capable to use violence for pursuing their
objectives, (ii) not integrated into formalized state
institutions such as regular armies, police or special forces,
(iii) possess a certain autonomy with regards to politics,
military operations, resources and infrastructure, and (iv)
shaped through an organizational relationship or structure
that exists over a specific period of time (spontaneous
[protests] would not qualify).50

Armed non-state actors have existed for as long as their counterpart – the
state. For centuries, armed groups have challenged state authority, and states have
responded with the goal of preserving that authority. ANSAs have further
challenged customary law identifying the state as the sole legitimate entity in the
use of force. States may respond with the use of force, but laws and norms exist
limiting the use of force by states. The question remains however; how can the
behavior of non-states be similarly influenced to conform to the norm of civilian
protection? Of note, there are ANSAs that voluntarily adhere to the norm
prohibiting civilian harm. Liberation groups such as the African National Congress
(ANC) provide a specific example. Although the ANC deliberately took part in an
50
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armed struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa, its leadership formally
renounced civilian targets. 51 The purpose of this thesis is to better understand
ANSAs that do not commit to the protection of civilians.
Ulrich Schnechener has developed a framework in which to analyze various
ANSAs, their general characteristics, and their motivation. (see Table 3:1 below)

TABLE 3:1
52

Types of Armed Non-State Actors

Schnechener, (2009)

Some ANSAs are viewed as potential allies in reduction of violence against
civilians; some as spoilers. Some are motivated by political ideals; some by the goal of
acquiring territory. Behavior of these groups is not static, and often groups can transition
from one category to another, or exhibit a hybrid of descriptors. The objective is not to
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rigidly classify a non-state group; rather it is to learn about the group’s behavior,
particularly its violent conduct, and posit ways that behavior might be influenced. As can
be seen in Table 3:1, ANSAs can use physical violence, psychological violence, or both
to promote their cause. Strategies that aim to reduce violence must then promote norms
that address both physical (civilian protection) and psychological (civilian immunity)
aspects.
The case studies chosen for this thesis exemplify several types of the
aforementioned ANSAs: rebels/guerrilla (Moro Islamic Liberation Front); hybrid of
warlord and Big Man (Lord’s Resistance Army); and a fluctuation between
rebel/guerrilla and clan chiefs (National Transition Council). Whether the type of ANSA
makes any difference to NGOs attempting to influence behavior will be discussed in my
analysis of the case studies.
ANSAs are not party to treaties; nor are they recognized by the United Nations as
having a voice at the “official” table. So the Secretary General’s problem (as well as
society’s) is very real. This critique is well summarized in the 2011 Report of the
Secretary General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka:
Although non-state actors cannot formally become party to a human rights
treaty, it is now increasingly accepted that non-state groups exercising de
facto control over a part of a State’s territory must respect fundamental
human rights of persons in that territory. Various organs of the United
Nations, including the Security Council, have repeatedly demanded that
such actors respect human rights law. Although the Panel recognizes that
there remains some difference of views on the subject among international
actors, it proceeds on the assumption that, at a minimum, the LTTE [an
ANSA] was bound to respect the most basic human rights of persons
within its power, including the rights to life and physical security and
37

integrity of the person, and freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment and punishment. 53
What then would compel a non-state actor to recognize and honor customary
international humanitarian law, in particular the principle of distinction? Scholars,
diplomats, in-the-field negotiators, and others have been both asking this question, and
implementing possible answers into best practice these past five years. The landscape of
warfare has changed, and traditional means of resolving conflict all too often fail.
Innovative and constructive approaches are needed to engage players who may have little
incentive to abide by customary law. If state power is the very thing an ANSA is fighting
against, the opposing state will likely have little control over the behavior of the ANSA.
If international organizations like the United Nations are not directly involved in a timely
and effective fashion, civilians are at risk. Civil society and INGOs therefore have a void
to fill, and a crucial role to play. They can do this primarily through two means:


conflict resolution, thereby ending direct assault on civilians; or



norm diffusion – making sure civilian protection becomes the

standard principle guiding armed operations.
Claudia Hofman pioneered the research introducing this premise. Prior to her
research published in 2012, there had been no systematic appraisal of the strengths and
weaknesses of INGOs in their attempt to engage armed non-state actors. She gives two
examples of an INGO engaging in conflict resolution: the Center for Humanitarian
Dialogue with the Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia, and the Carter Center in Uganda
with the Lord’s Resistance Army, and examines the particular work of these INGOs in
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negotiating a reduction in violence against civilians. Regarding norm diffusion, or the
penetration of civilian protection into the modus operandi of an armed group, Hofman
highlights two other INGOs: Geneva Call in persuading Kurdish groups like the PKK to
stop landmine use; and the global efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) to hold all warring parties to the principle of distinction between combatant and
non-combatant. 54 Hofman is blunt in her assessment of both the weaknesses and the
strengths of INGOs.
States and international organisations need to recognize the contribution
that INGOs can make to their policies and priorities… [They] should
consider awarding limited mandates to specialised INGOs to discuss
individual issues with armed groups and extending unofficial support to
selected INGOs in engaging armed actors. With greater support from the
international community, INGOs’ contributions could become more
substantial and could complement other ongoing efforts to change the
behaviour of armed groups. By understanding the individual strengths and
weaknesses of INGOs, as well as their different goals and practices, it
could become possible to combine approaches to overcome the
weaknesses of individual approaches and to achieve a more
comprehensive strategy for engaging non-state armed actors. 55
Whereas Hofman focuses primarily on the concrete means of civilian protection,
ie; conflict resolution and norm diffusion, I am interested in two particular attributes of
civil society and INGOs that enhance these means. INGOs with access to non-state
actors, and less negotiating constraints, can work directly to decrease conflict and spread
protection norms.
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Lastly, what is also important to the violence-reduction equation is the historical context
within which each ANSA operates. The time period, as well as the social, political and
economic circumstances of each armed conflict can all play a role in civilian harm. In the
following chapter, I use case studies to evaluate why civilians were effectively protected
in certain armed conflict situations, and not in others. Further, the case studies will help
determine what role, if any, civil society and INGOs played in that protection.
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CHAPTER 4:
Case Studies
So far, we have traced the history of civilian protection throughout the last
century. We have concluded that civilian protection has become more effective for
conflicts involving two states (interstate). Further, we know the vast majority of current
armed conflict today involves a non-state actor, and statistically, these conflicts tend to
result in major harm to civilians.
An interesting study of third party attempts to mediate intrastate conflict
occurring in African states from 1993 to 2007 communicates the importance of third
party intervention. Using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Croicu and colleagues
examined 2500 events of peacekeeping during the study timeframe and found that two
variables had a benign effect on the amount of violence after an intervention. First,
former colonial powers, which often retain a vested self-interest in enhancing stability in
a former colony, have a positive effect in reducing violence. Second, international
organizations (IOs) and NGOs, which may be viewed as more neutral, and instead
“motivated by general principles that connect to international law, and by a desire to
cultivate a reputation for being successful in peacemaking,” also have the effect of
reducing violence. 56 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was
specifically mentioned, as well as Sant’Egidio, an Italian INGO well respected for its
mediation in armed conflicts. Both entities had access to ANSAs because of their
reputation and their stated mission, and fewer negotiating constraints led to opportunity
56
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to both deescalate conflict as well as spread the norm of civilian protection. My
hypothesis will test whether civil society and NGOs engaging with ANSAs in the three
case studies had similar success. In this chapter, I use three case studies, analyzing the
degree of civilian harm involved, and the role of civil society. I am interested in
determining whether the actions of civil society groups were instrumental in protecting
civilians.

Case #1: The Lord’s Resistance Army vs. Uganda

Historical Context of the Conflict and Extent of Civilian Harm:
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) began as an armed resistance group against
the government of Uganda in 1986. The LRA persists to the present day, giving it the
dubious distinction of causing one of Africa’s most longstanding violent armed conflicts.
Millions of civilians have been displaced; tens of thousands have died. There have been
sputtered attempts to resolve the insurgency by four African governments, the African
Union, the United Nations and the United States. Yet still the LRA remains, weakened
significantly but active, to continue its reign of terror among the civilian population.
The history of post-colonial Uganda is similar to that of other African nations.
Uganda was formerly a territory of the United Kingdom and achieved its independence in
1962. Until 1986, power and the presidency transferred back and forth between several
individuals including Milton Obote, Idi Amin Dada, and Uganda’s current president
Yoweri Museveni – who himself came to power as the leader of a rebel group the
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National Resistance Movement/Army.57 Since then, Museveni is largely credited with
creating a relatively successful economy in comparison to other African nations.
1986 also saw the formation of the LRA. Its leader Joseph Kony is from the
northern part of Uganda known as the Acholi region. Initially, Kony characterized his
movement as one intending to defend the rights of the marginalized Acholi people. Those
in the region however, quickly realized that Kony had few political goals concerning their
welfare. The LRA instead practiced mass murder, rape, and mutilation to perpetuate its
terror. Losing public support, the LRA resorted to the abduction of children to continue
its operations. “A 2006 study funded by UNICEF estimated that at least 66,000 children
and youth had been abducted by the LRA between 1986 and 2006.” 58
Important to the history of the LRA is the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath.
Uganda joined Rwanda in intervening militarily in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1996 and 1998. During this period, a major
war unfolded in Congo involving militaries from six African countries and
a broad array of rebel groups. While much of the fighting was directly
linked to … the presence of Hutu militias seeking refuge in Congo, all of
these military forces sought to exploit the rich natural resources in eastern
Congo for their own benefit.” 59
The effect of these past military exploits remains today. The four African nations
integrally involved in combatting LRA forces in 2014 continue to be deeply distrustful of
each other’s motives, which ultimately impedes the LRA’s defeat.
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Throughout the years, there have been several military attempts to neutralize the
LRA threat which have all ended in failure. Some would rightly argue that Kony’s
response to each military deployment seeking his capture has only exacerbated civilian
harm. In 2002, the Ugandan army launched Operation Iron Fist. Its aim was to crush the
LRA insurgency. Its ultimate effect was the spread of LRA violence into three
neighboring countries and the displacement of more than 1.7 million Ugandans. 60
Beginning in 1996, the Ugandan government had set up “protected villages” in efforts to
reduce civilian harm. By 2004, these villages had morphed into squalid camps housing
nearly eighty percent of the population of Northern Uganda, as characterized by The
Resolve, a research and advocacy NGO focusing on the LRA crisis. “Within these camps,
problems of starvation, poor sanitation, psychosocial trauma, lack of education,
HIV/AIDS … persisted on a gross level. In 2005, reports revealed that nearly one
thousand people were dying each week as a result of camp conditions.” 61 The camps not
only failed to protect civilians; the camps, in fact, contributed to civilian death.
Two important events occurred however, in late 2005. A referral to the
International Criminal Court by the Ugandan government two years earlier culminated in
arrest warrants issued for Joseph Kony and four of his top aides. Also, the LRA moved
the base of their operations from Uganda to South Sudan, then to the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), and eventually to Central African Republic (CAR), making
the LRA not only a Ugandan menace, but a regional threat.
Negotiations throughout 2006 and into 2008 failed to broker a peaceful resolution.
Dubbed the Juba peace process (because meetings took place in the new South Sudan
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capital of Juba), talks between LRA senior officers and the Ugandan government were
unsuccessful in resolving the conflict. “Hope for a final agreement was sustained by a
series of intermediary agreements, including one on transitional justice mechanisms in
Uganda, and by the efforts of special envoys from the US, Europe, Africa and the UN to
keep the parties at the table.” 62 For his part, Kony reportedly ordered the execution of
his top deputy Vincent Otti for being too in favor of a peace agreement. Kony also failed
to show for a peace agreement signing ceremony in April 2008. With all factions growing
frustrated, LRA attacks on civilians resumed. Mediators set a November 30th, 2008
deadline for Kony to sign an agreement, and in fact, Kony did meet with civil society
leaders from Northern Uganda on November 29th. Unfortunately, they were unable to
obtain his signature for a truce. Peace talks ended in failure, and the next wave of LRA
terror began.
Operation Lightening Thunder was launched by the Ugandan military midDecember 2008. With an initial goal of routing LRA forces from Garamba National Park
in DRC, the operation failed miserably, despite US financial and logistical support. LRA
reprisal attacks, the so-called Christmas Massacres, killed hundreds of Congolese
civilians. In the years since, LRA senior commanders have repeatedly been able to elude
capture by shifting base operations between three countries (DRC, CAR and South
Sudan), capitalizing on the inability of these three governments and Uganda to coordinate
their efforts. Of note, there has not been an LRA attack on Ugandan soil since 2006.
Museveni remains halfheartedly committed to disarmament efforts; as Ugandans are now
for the most part protected. But he is keenly aware of a possible renewed incursion into
Uganda’s northern territory, as there has been historical precedent.
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The Role of Civil Society/NGOs in Civilian Protection:
According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the
LRA’s systematic violations of international law, human rights and international
humanitarian law have resulted in more than 100,000 deaths, between 60,000 and
100,000 children abducted and 2.5 million people displaced. 63 These statistics provide a
stark reminder of the lethal threat the LRA has wreaked upon the civilian population of
Central Africa for more than twenty five years. There is now however, a marked decrease
in fatalities stemming from LRA violence. Themner and Wallensteen, researchers
focused on armed conflict note:
In the conflict between the Ugandan government and its allies, and the
rebel groups LRA (Lord’s Resistance Army) and ADF (Allied Democratic
Forces), the fighting de-escalated in 2012 and did not cross the 25 battlerelated deaths threshold. [emphasis mine] Both rebel groups are based
outside Uganda, and Kampala is dependent on the assistance of
neighbouring governments to be able to confront them… As for LRA, the
group has split up into smaller units, moving over a large area and
avoiding direct contact with enemy forces, making them difficult to track
down. 64
The threat to civilians directly caused by the LRA is now in its twenty eighth year.
Civilian death has been greatly attenuated, yet despite the military efforts of four African
states, the violence continues. With historical precedent as support, civilians
understandably distrust military intervention as the sole path to lasting protection. The
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capture, trial, and accountability of Joseph Kony for his crimes, and disarming of his
troops seems a likelier final solution.
International NGOs such as Invisible Children, the Enough Project, Human
Rights Watch, Resolve, Amnesty International, and others have been active in trying to
end this crisis. In particular, they lobbied the U.S. Congress and the Bush and Obama
Administrations to become more actively involved in ending the LRA threat. U.S. based
activist groups took up the anti-LRA cause beginning 2004-2006. The pressure of these
INGOs to capture Kony and relieve civilian suffering helped push President Obama to
sign into law the “Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery
Act” in 2010. As required by this legislation, the Obama administration reported to U.S.
Congress its “Strategy to Support the Disarmament of the LRA” that November. The
strategy described four main objectives: protect civilians; capture Kony and LRA senior
commanders; disarm, demobilize and reintegrate former LRA fighters; and provide
humanitarian relief to affected communities. It further outlines “U.S. assistance in
support of efforts of the government of Uganda and civil society to promote
comprehensive reconstruction, transitional justice and reconciliation in Uganda.”65 In
response to this new American interest, thirty four African civil society organizations
sent an “urgent appeal to President Obama” in December 2010 calling for the immediate
implementation of the strategy. They noted the stated goal of increased civilian protection
and urged the President to place top priority on this goal. The organizations were blunt in
their assessments of the failures of both UN peacekeepers and their own national armies
in keeping them safe. Despite the military engagement of four nations, and the presence
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of UN “blue helmets”, LRA attacks were still occurring and civilians were still being
harmed. The appeal ended by stating, “we have suffered so much from a war that is not
our own and have often felt forgotten and ignored by our own governments and by the
international community. This new strategy has given us hope.” 66 Partially in response
to this pressure, President Obama authorized a deployment of one hundred military
advisors in October 2011. By year’s end, the advisory force had taken up positions in
CAR, South Sudan and DRC. Concurrently, the African Union designated the LRA a
terrorist group in an effort to encourage regional cooperation towards the LRA’s defeat.
In addition, in 2012 the Lord’s Resistance Army garnered broad international
public condemnation. Much of this attention was initiated by the release of a video, Kony
2012, which went viral on the internet and was viewed more than 100 million times. The
producers of the video were from the NGO Invisible Children Inc. and they listed four
goals for their campaign: make Kony infamous; increase civilian protection; pressure
international governments to support regional efforts at stopping LRA violence; and the
arrest and trial of Kony and his top commanders before the ICC. 67 Although an
American-based NGO, the group has regional offices in Africa, and partners with civil
society in Sudan, Uganda, CAR, and DRC to implement on-the-ground activities in
Central Africa. Some of the more novel approaches to civilian protection include
encouraging defections from the LRA by concrete means: FM radio, defection flyers, and
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high frequency radio networks. 68 The Invisible Children website details the
organization’s:
investment in data-gathering since 2010, when it launched the LRA Crisis
Tracker, broadcasting LRA movements and attacks based on information
relayed via 71 high-frequency radios. The community reports are vetted
through regional experts and updated to the tracker twice daily. The
tracker provides an email subscription service, which Invisible Children
says is used by state and military officials in the U.S. and central Africa,
local communities, and other NGOs. 69

Local Civil Society:
Civil society in Uganda has also taken on an important role in civilian protection.
Civilians recognize that the military alone cannot solve the LRA problem for a variety of
reasons: national armies and their commanders distrust one another; the area of LRA
operations is remote, densely forested, and often lacks communication capability; and
LRA soldiers are often men and boys who have been abducted from the very villages in
need of protection, not recruits who agree with Kony’s ideology. Several Ugandan NGOs
and religious groups have formed in order to address and exploit these particular nuances
in the cause of better protection. Some of these are described below:
Jamii Ya Kupatanisha (JYAK) is the Ugandan branch of the INGO Fellowship
of Reconciliation and a Swahili phrase which transliterates its name. The group began as
a peace club in 1988 and has grown to become a national organization working on
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peacebuilding, and since 2007, reintegration of childhood soldiers back into society. 70
JYAK has published four training manuals, and has worked with the Ministry of
Education in Uganda on changing the culture of violence through peace building for
Ugandan school children.
Center for Conflict Resolution (CECORE) has worked in the Great Lakes
region of Africa since 1995. Its projects include working in the massive camps that have
become home to millions of refugees seeking safety from the LRA, primarily by “training
the trainers” in conflict resolution. The group is also involved in Peace Radio, and the
Women’s Peace Initiative (prior and during the Juba talks). CECORE played an active
role in Building Bridges, a program that promotes dialogue between two parties in an
armed conflict and one which eventually led to an agreement between the Ugandan
government and the United National Rebel Front II – a truce that holds to this day.
Because of their experience in negotiating and resolving conflict, they are working in
both a local and regional capacity to deflate LRA violence. 71
Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) is an interfaith organization
formed in 1997 as a “proactive” response to the violent conflict in northern Uganda. They
work using dialogue between opposing factions, reconciliation, and peace building
strategies.72 Concretely, ARLPI contributed to the development of the Ugandan Amnesty
Act which granted former LRA foot soldiers, themselves often the victims of abduction
and forced conscription, amnesty under certain conditions. They also brought
international attention to the plight of the night commuters, children who travel from their
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remote villages nightly to elude possible abduction by sleeping outside in the streets of
more populated cities. ARLPI partnered with groups such as Invisible Children, based in
the United States, and organized a campaign wherein activists slept outside overnight in
American cities to highlight the insecurity and danger faced by African children daily.
This example demonstrates a strategic partnership between a grass roots, local NGO and
a wealthy, international NGO combining strengths to address a specific need –in this
case, the protection of central African children from roaming LRA units.
The Acholi Religious Leaders have offered to mediate the situation between state
representatives and the forces loyal to the LRA multiple times. In 2008, rebel leaders had
begun negotiations when a Ugandan military offensive drove them into neighboring
countries, causing the current regional threat.
In 2010, Archbishop Odama of Gulu (then head of ARLPI) and Anglican Bishop
MacLeord Baker Ochola II traveled to the U.S. and urged “U.S. officials to end the use of
force in dealing with the LRA. They cited numerous occasions on [sic] which force did
not work against the rebel group,” and in fact had led to a backlash of violence against
civilians. Both men said that they did not oppose the Lord's Resistance Army
Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act, signed by President Obama (described
earlier), but were clear that non-military, complementary strategies were necessary to
ultimately put an end to the violence. Of note, Bishop Ochola’s daughter committed
suicide in 1987 after being brutally attacked by the LRA 73 giving him unique credibility
in lobbying efforts as a bereaved family member, religious leader, and an Acholi citizen.
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Youth United for Environmental Protection and Community Development
(JUPEDEC), is another such group. As a local NGO operating in CAR, it agrees that
civil society has played a vital role in the hunt for Kony. Recognizing that the insurgency
cannot end by military force alone, JUPEDEC acknowledges that the fight against the
LRA will involve many actors: civil society, the church, the army and local authorities all
must be mobilized to call for LRA members to defect. “The more we multiply military
attacks, the more we aggravate the situation of the civilian population; hence the need to
focus on encouraging defections. The LRA has been in existence for 26 years, and armed
response has not been able to stop it," Alexis Lewis Mbolinani (JUPEDEC’s coordinator)
stated in 2012. 74
Civil society leaders from all countries affected by the LRA problem met [in
October 2013] in Brussels with European and American activists. In a joint statement,
they called for urgent action to end the atrocities perpetrated by the LRA, and to help
affected communities recover from years of both psychological and physical trauma.
"The LRA remains a critical situation in the region," said Archbishop of Kisangani
Marcel Utembi from the DRC, "In order to overcome this crisis, we need a coordinated
approach from every actor in the region, and increased support to local organizations
working to help those most affected."75
In sum, civil society groups have been involved in the conflict in a variety of
ways: mediation, advocacy, demobilization, reintegration, transitional justice, and
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education about safety. According to the U.S. State Department, “more than 12,000
former LRA fighters and abductees have left the group and been reintegrated through
Uganda’s Amnesty Commission since 2000. Many more have escaped and returned to
their communities without going through reception centers.”76 More recently, a report
written by Kasper Agger for the Enough Project entitled Completing the Mission detailed
further success:
U.S. advisors and their African partners have made progress in
significantly reducing LRA attacks, increasing LRA defections, improving
human security and protection for civilians, increasing intelligence
collection and analysis, and improving logistics with supply lines. LRA
attacks have dropped by 53 percent over the past two years, and LRA
killings decreased by 67 percent from 2011 to 2012. At least 31 Ugandan
LRA fighters—15 percent of the core fighting force—have defected over
the past 18 months. The number of defections this year exceeds those of
the previous two years combined. 77
Examples of direct civil society involvement in partnership with the military
include tracking the whereabouts of LRA members in the bush and informing authorities;
putting in place early warning systems to warn neighboring communities by radio of
approaching danger; and weekly security meetings with both African and U.S. advisors.
Communication here can be bi-directional: locals adding to intelligence collection, and
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advisors passing on important information to the local community. All of the above
efforts have combined to reduce civilian death, a welcome outcome.
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Case Study #2: The Moro Islamic Liberation Front vs. the Philippine
Government
Historical Context of the Conflict and Extent of Civilian Harm:
Conflict has existed for centuries on the large island of Mindanau, part of the
Philippine archipelago. The island was initially settled by Muslim traders in the first
millennium, long pre-dating the arrival of Spaniards in the seventeenth century. Whereas
the island of Luzon (home to the modern capital city Manila), and many of the
surrounding smaller islands were predominantly converted to Catholicism, Mindanau
remained Islamic in its cultural, religious and political life. Hence the term ‘Moro” has
been used when referring to the inhabitants of Mindanau. In the 1960s, the government of
the Philippines initiated a resettlement policy whereby Christians from northern islands
were moved to the resource-rich south and western part of Mindanau. This government
intervention is the root cause of the present day conflict in Mindanau. Muslim inhabitants
were discriminated against, property was confiscated and re-allocated, and Christians
were heavily favored in terms of the opportunity for employment and advancement. In
the 1970s, native Muslims reacted to the new Christian elite majority by forming an
armed resistance group known as the Moro Nationalist Liberation Front (MNLF). For
more than three decades now, civilians have lived through alternating periods of armed
conflict and peace negotiations.
The worst violence occurred from 1972-1976, during dictator Ferdinand Marcos’
presidency, when an estimated one hundred twenty thousand Filipinos were killed and
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more than one million internally displaced persons were created. 78 Today the conflict
continues, attenuated, yet still causing civilian harm.
The Tripoli Agreement, signed in 1976, did quell much of the large scale
violence, but never provided a complete resolution. The negotiations were sponsored by
the government of Libya and the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, and agreed
upon by the Marcos government of the Philippines and the MLNF. However, within a
year the ceasefire collapsed and a splinter group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) was formed – a less conservative faction of the MNLF representing those
frustrated by an unfulfilled promise of regional autonomy. With the Corazon Aquino
administration of 1986 came new opportunities for real peace. In 1989, legislation was
passed creating the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanau (ARMM), but also
requiring a vote by plebiscite in the thirteen provinces and nine cities of the affected
portion of Mindanau. Only four of the provinces voted for inclusion in ARMM, largely
because other provinces now had a Christian majority stemming from migration policy
initiated thirty years before. The MNLF broke off talks with the Aquino government, and
the next phase of armed conflict resumed. 79
1996 marked yet another peace accord between the chairman of the MNLF, Nur
Musari, and then president Fidel Ramos. This agreement established the Southern
Philippines Council for Peace and Development, and set up special zones particularly
targeted for economic development. In three years, provinces would again be asked to
join the ARMM. Only one additional province voted yes to the plebiscite. The late 1990s
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also saw the waning influence of the MNLF (due to its failure to implement economic
reforms and widespread corruption), prompting the further rise in power of the MILF. In
April 2000, new president Joseph Estrada declared an “all-out war policy” against the
MILF for alleged atrocities against civilians. Complicating most armed conflict in the
Philippines however, is the presence of armed clans whose feuds date back centuries and
can be mistaken for Moro insurgent activity.
Unlike her predecessor, the next president Gloria Arroyo issued an “all-out peace
policy” toward the MILF. This cease fire was broken in 2003 when the Filipino military
launched a new offensive in Central Mindanau against what was termed criminal
elements. Talks hosted by the Malaysian government again led to a peace agreement. As
described by Shiavo-Campo and Judd, “the Government – MILF Joint Ceasefire
Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (JC-CCCH) was tasked to
monitor any violation of the ceasefire agreement. It was also agreed during the
exploratory talks to welcome an International Monitoring Team, led by Malaysia, to
complement the work of the JC-CCCH and strengthen the peace process at the ground
level.”80 Several countries as well as INGOs serve in this role as international monitors.
Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) is one such organization I will focus on later.
Presently (2014), negotiations have again resumed between the MILF, which
claims to represent the Bangsamoro people (the collective name of peoples living in
Muslim majority Mindanau) and the Philippine government. The current president,
Benigno Aquino, is now halfway through his six year term and seems committed to
expending political capital to secure a lasting settlement. For their part, the MILF refuses
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to lay down their arms until regional autonomy becomes a political reality. Many
potential spoilers to a firm agreement remain, not the least of which is a possible
constitutional challenge as to whether Mindanau can legally form independent political,
judicial and legal systems, yet still remain part of the nation-state the Philippines. 81
Statistically, civilian death has markedly decreased from the 1970s to present day.
More than one hundred thousand civilians were killed during the first Marcos presidency
(1972-1976). 82 According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), the armed
conflict between the Philippine government and the MILF did not meet the threshold
criteria of twenty five battle deaths to be included in their list of intrastate armed conflicts
for 2012. That is a positive outcome. Unfortunately for civilians, conflict between the
Philippine government and other armed groups, notably the radical Abu Sayyaf and the
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement, did make the registry – with an estimated 114
battle deaths in 2012. 83
Civilian protection in Mindanau remains a serious issue. Western media have
chosen to highlight several instances when tourists have been kidnapped and/or taken
hostage. The instances of harm and death of Filipino civilians receives much less of a
global spotlight. The looming menace of armed conflict remains an intractable problem,
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as civilians rightly remember instances of broken cease-fires and renewed fighting in
2000, 2003 and 2008.
The Role of Civil Society / NGOs in Civilian Protection:
While the public stance of the Philippine government concerning negotiations
certainly plays a major role in engaging the MILF (“all out war” vs. “all out peace”), the
role of civil society in decreasing civilian harm has also been crucial. INGOs such as
Nonviolent Peaceforce and Geneva Call were specifically asked to become involved in
ceasefire monitoring and abolition of landmines respectively.
Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) was formed in 2002 as an organization dedicated to
the concept of unarmed civilian peacekeeping. Although based in the state of Minnesota
in the United States, delegates from forty nine countries representing various sectors of
civil society met in India for the convening event. Within one year, Nonviolent
Peaceforce had peacekeepers deployed and on the ground in their first mission in Sri
Lanka.
The objectives of NP are fourfold:


To foster a lasting peace between warring parties



To protect civilians during violent conflict



To promote the theory and practice of unarmed civilian

peacekeeping


To develop and train a pool of civilian peacekeepers willing to

deploy to conflict zones
Further, Nonviolent Peaceforce abides by three guiding principles: nonviolence –
weapons will never be carried or used by their peacekeepers; nonpartisanship – NP staff
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will show no favoritism towards any faction involved in a conflict; and noninterference –
NP has no preference in the outcome of the conflict.84 The overarching goal is reduction
in violence, regardless of its source.
Nonviolent Peaceforce was approached by civil society groups operating in the
Mindanau area of the Philippines initially in 2003. These groups were interested in
nonviolent methods to assist in resolving what was then a decades-old conflict. After a
three year consultative phase, NP Philippines was officially launched in 2007. By 2010,
NP employed fifty nine staff, and was engaged in the following activities:
• civilian protection to local and international human rights groups;
• accompaniment of victims of human rights violations and affected population;
• trainings [sic] in human rights protection and International Humanitarian Law
(IHL), early warning for affected population and community based organizations;
• documentation and reporting of human rights violations;
• regular needs assessments among the affected population, especially Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs);
• organization and facilitation of dialogues and information-sharing meetings on
security situation for international diplomats, local civil society organizations and
representatives of the conflict parties;
• local and international cease-fire monitoring initiates and structures. 85
NP partnered with local civil society organizations such as Consortium of
Bangsamoro Civil Society Organizations, Ginapaladtaka (G7), United Youth for Peace
and Development (UNYPAD), Chrislam, Magungaya Center for Palma Inc., Kadtuntaya
Foundation Inc. (KFI), Mindanao Peoples Caucasus (MPC), Bantay Ceasefire,
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Bangsamoro Center for Just Peace (BCJP), Magungaya Mindanao Inc (MMI), Madia
Center for Peace and Development (MCPD), and CSOs for Peace. 86 Because of their
careful planning and strategic collaborations, NP in the Philippines was able to engage
both state and non-state actors in their work.
Given the thirty year cycle of violence/ceasefire/violence, both the Philippine
government and the MILF agreed to an International Monitoring Team (IMT) in 2004 as
part of the peace process. A civilian protection component was added in 2009, and that
year NP accepted the offer to join the IMT. The team primarily consists of non-Filipinos
to enhance its neutrality. Their focus is to monitor and enforce the latest ceasefire. In
April 2014, the IMT, which includes both military and civilian contingents, was reduced
from its original sixty members to thirty six. The draw down in part stems from plans for
the MILF and Philippine government to sign final peace accords by the end of 2014. 87
Since the region has a history of tenuous cease fires at best, the Coordinating
Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities also proactively recognized the ability of
outside individuals and groups to reignite conflict. For centuries, allegiance within the
Philippine archipelago has often been to one’s clan, not to a national identity. Further,
“regular” criminal activity exists in the region as elsewhere. To separate out which armed
clashes accurately involved MILF forces, and which involved apolitical, illegal
misconduct or rido (clan dispute), the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG) was formed.
AHJAG has four members; two from the MILF and two from the government. Their job
is to prevent potential spoilers from derailing the peace process, an example of which
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was AHJAG intervention to win the release of a kidnapped police officer in Mindanau in
December 2013 - which could have led to flare up of violence.
As noted above, groups other than the MILF and the Philippine government have
contributed to renewed violence towards civilians. Just as surely, outside groups can
contribute towards civilian protection. Geneva Call is another such group and a neutral
and impartial humanitarian organization dedicated to engaging armed non-state actors
(ANSAs) towards compliance with the norms of international humanitarian law (IHL)
and human rights law (HRL). The organization focuses on ANSAs that operate outside
effective state control and are primarily motivated by political goals. 88
Geneva Call has been operating in the Philippines since its inception in 2000. The
INGO’s original focus was the elimination of land mines, which had been used by both
sides of the conflict throughout its history. The Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a
Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action is an instrument
developed by Geneva Call which now has forty three NSA signatories, including three in
the Philippines: the MILF, the Revolutionary Workers Party of Mindanau (RPM), and the
Revolutionary Workers Party of the Philippines/ Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex
Bocayo (RPM/RPA-ABB). Additional to their work on banning land mines,
Geneva Call co-organized three trainings [sic] of MILF members on
human rights and international humanitarian law, including programs
targeting women and youth. These training workshops were carried out in
partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and
local civil society actors, including the Institute for Bangsamoro Studies,
the Southeast Asia Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers
(SEACSUCS), and the Center for Muslim Youth Studies (CMYSI).
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Geneva Call also helped to facilitate the development of a joint
government/MILF unexploded ordnance clearance program that will be
undertaken by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) and local civil
society actors. 89
In a novel collaboration between the MILF and the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP), Geneva Call led a mission in 2009 to investigate allegations of
landmine use by the MILF. As a signatory to the Deed of Commitment, the MILF had
previously agreed to both internal and external monitoring of the land mine ban. Because
there are no concrete enforcement mechanisms if an ANSA breaks its commitment and
disregards the ban, it is adherence to the norm of landmine prohibition that holds the
ANSA accountable. Of note, Nonviolent Peaceforce, as a trusted nonpartisan NGO,
accompanied the mission team in its investigation. Ultimately, the team found that AP
landmine use had occurred, but was not able to irrefutably identify the perpetrator. A
member of the mission team, Eric David, Professor of International Law at the Free
University of Brussels and legal and fact-finding expert, said, “As far as I am aware, this
is the first time in the history of international relations that such a fact-finding mission
has been carried out with the agreement of, and facilitation by, both parties to an armed
conflict, in casu, a State and a non-State actor.” 90
The increased civilian protection offered by two international NGOs as illustrated
in the conflict between the Philippine government and the MILF is exceptional. First, to
have a purposefully unarmed “force” providing protection to civilians is distinctive. This
ideal recalls the one-to-one protection afforded to Central American potential targets for
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assassination by groups such as Witness For Peace91 in the 1980s. It is also an ideal that
has attracted the attention of policymakers in recent years. Both the United States
Institute for Peace and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research held
conferences on the practice of unarmed civilian peacekeeping in 2012. Practitioners from
the field in both Sudan and the Philippines placed an:
emphasis on the need to integrate civil society into UN peacekeeping
efforts on a collaborative basis, as different actors have limitations and can
complement each other. Speakers pointed out that unarmed civilian
peacekeepers often have an enhanced knowledge of and access to local
communities, which facilitate their interaction with different stakeholders
at the local level … and stressed the necessity for both local and national
strategies to find political solutions and address the causes of conflict. 92
Second, an INGO (Geneva Call) led the mission to investigate possible landmine
use. This unique circumstance provides an example of how a specialized INGO can
render unique services that ultimately increase civilian protection. Again, since an ANSA
cannot be a signatory to a ban on landmines, Geneva Call filled the void in both creating
the Deed of Commitment, and working towards the accountability of all parties involved
in an armed conflict that includes landmine use.
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Case Study # 3: Libya vs. National Transition Council
Historical Context of the Conflict and Extent of Civilian Harm:
The beginnings of the Libyan conflict center largely in what has popularly been
known as the “Arab Spring.” Set off by the overthrow of Tunisian president Ben Ali, and
fueled by the call for Egyptian president Mubarak’s resignation, Libyans began publicly
expressing their discontent in early 2011. By October 2011, the conflict had formally
ended, and Colonel Qaddafi was dead.
Muammar Qaddafi deposed then King Idris I in 1969 in the “bloodless coup.”
Qaddafi immediately abolished the Libyan Constitution, and enunciated his political
philosophy in The Green Book, published in 1975. In theory, Qaddafi attempted to form a
direct democracy through a system of people’s committees and the indirectly elected
General People’s Congress. In practice, the committees proved little more than a reward
system for Qaddafi supporters and loyalists. Political opposition parties were outlawed,
and there was no freedom of the press as both the media and internet service providers
were state run. Labor unions were prohibited. Non-governmental organizations were
allowed to exist, but at a minimum, were indirectly connected to the Qaddafi regime. 105
Of note, Qaddafi himself held no real title within Libya, having “resigned” in 1977. The
official leadership was the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (“the state of the
masses”), although by accounts both national and worldwide, Qaddafi retained almost
exclusive power.
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For all its shortcomings, there were enormous gains in the lives of most Libyans
during the Qaddafi years. According to a United Nations International Children’s
Education Fund (UNICEF) report in 2009, Libya had:


a buoyant growth rate, with GDP having risen from $27.3 billion

in 1998 to $93.2 billion by 2009 according to the World Bank;


high per capita income (estimated by the World Bank at $16,430);



high literacy rates (95 per cent for males and 78 percent for

females aged fifteen and above);


high life expectancy at birth (74 years overall; 77 for females and

72 for males); and


a consequent ranking of 55 out of 182 countries in terms of overall

“Human Development”. 106
Despite these gains, Libyans were aware of the marked disparity in wealth
between the Qaddafi family and close loyalists, and the average Libyan. According to the
International Crisis Group:
an important element of Libyan public opinion, at least, had come to see
things differently and, instead of comparing present conditions to the past,
compared them instead to the impressions they have of conditions in other
oil-rich Arab countries. Given a population of a mere six million, many
Libyans believe their country ought to resemble Dubai.107
Indeed it was this exact economic inequality that Qaddafi himself initially tried
capitalize on by blaming “the government” in January 2011 for the housing shortage and
encouraging Libyans to take what was rightfully theirs. Popular unrest, awareness of
current events in Tunisia and Egypt, and the arrest of an admired lawyer Fathi Terbil in
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Benghazi all combined to lead to the first public demonstrations against the state in midFebruary 2011. The Libyan conflict was born.
February 17th 2011 had been marked by the Muslim diaspora as “The Day of
Rage,” the anniversary of the publication of a Danish cartoon perceived as an insult to the
prophet Muhammad. Libyan opposition groups capitalized on this sentiment and began
calling for massive public demonstrations around the country to express a deeper
discontent with the current economic and political situation. Protests happened in several
cities, including Benghazi and Tripoli, and protestors were fired on by police and security
forces. The conflict escalated over the next week, and confirmed reports of aerial
targeting of civilians by government security forces soon garnered worldwide attention.
(Although Western media was characterized by the International Crisis Group as one
sided, there were several global news outlets reporting on the rioting, looting and burning
of official state buildings by the protestors also.) Ahmed Jibril, a Libyan diplomat who
joined the protesters, explained:
Qaddafi’s guards started shooting people in [sic] the second day, and they
shot two people only. We had on that day in Al-Baida city only 300
protesters. When they killed two people, we had more than 5,000 at their
funeral, and when they killed fifteen people the next day, we had more
than 50,000 the following day …. This means that the more Qaddafi kills
people, the more people go into the streets. 108
By February 26th, acting with unusual alacrity, the United Nations Security
Council unanimously approved Resolution 1970 – notable because it marked the first
time a state had been referred to the International Criminal Court. Further, Resolution
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1970 implemented an arms embargo, restricted travel on certain regime members and
froze assets. Key to the resolution’s unanimity was the defection of the Libyan
ambassador to the United Nations, Ibrahim Dabbashi, who convinced other Council
members to vote in favor. In public statements, Dabbashi went on to:
thank Council Members for their unanimous action, which represented
moral support for his people, who were resisting the attacks. The
resolution would be a signal that an end must be put to the fascist regime
in Tripoli. He launched an appeal to all the officers of the Libyan armed
forces to support their own people and renounce their support for
Muammar Al-Qadhafi, whom he called ‘criminal’ and whom he said was
prepared to go to extremes to keep up the repression. 109
On March 17, 2011 the U.N. deepened its commitment to the Libyan opposition
by passing Resolution 1973 which explicitly stated civilian protection as its goal. Ten
Security Council members voted in favor; none opposed; and five, including permanent
members Russia and China abstained. Resolution 1973 authorized a “no–fly zone” over
Libya and approved “all necessary means” to protect civilians, except by a foreign
occupying force. Within days, French forces and others had crippled the Libyan air
capabilities, allowing the opposition to survive and gain crucial support. On March 31st,
NATO officially took over operational command of the no-fly zone, legitimizing the
intervention as an international effort rather than that of a singular nation.
Who exactly comprised the Libyan opposition at this point? It is a difficult question to
both quantify and qualify. The most well-known opposition unit was the Libyan Islamic
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Fighting Group. However, also battling were every day Libyans who made up the selfproclaimed National Liberation Army, “young men — students, artists, athletes, doctors,
lawyers and yes, some Islamists — (who) left their homes to take on Gadhafi's army.
Their strength was thought to lie in their diversity, in their willingness to fight and to die
for the right to live outside of Gadhafi's brutal autocratic grip.” 110 Ultimately, the
various factions of the opposition melded into what became known as the National
Transitional Council (NTC) – united in their demand for the ouster of Qaddafi, and goal
of new Libyan leadership.
By June, 2011, the conflict had become a stalemate. Gains and losses were traded
by both sides over the summer, with control of Tripoli the perceived yardstick of victory.
This happened on August 22 when opposition forces took the capital. Politically,
important recognition of the NTC as the de facto government of Libya came from the
United Nations and the World Bank less than a month later, in September.
Qaddafi was killed by extrajudicial means on October 20, 2011, formally marking
the end of the conflict. Subsequently, the NTC gained increased international recognition
as the governing entity of Libya, giving the interim council badly needed public, financial
and political support. The revolution was over, and the difficult task of rebuilding and
governing Libya began. Once the armed conflict had subsided, the new Libya could lay
down its weapons, and take stock of its loss.
According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, one-sided violence is the use of
armed force, by the government of a state or by a formally organized group, against
civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year. During the eight months of armed
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conflict between the government of Libya and the National Transition Council, estimates
of civilian death span a range from 2422 civilian casualties according to the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program, 111 to several thousands of civilian casualties caused by Qaddafi
forces, the thuwar (revolutionary forces) and NATO combined as measured by the UN
Human Rights Commission on Libya.112 The wide disparity may exist because the
Uppsala group requires confirmation from two sources before including a death in their
data set.
The Role of Civil Society / NGOs in Protection of Civilians:
The Libyan conflict started out as civil society’s peaceful protests over a dictator’s
absolute grip on power. Initially, civilian Libyans were not armed. But as the state’s
response to protests became more violent, civil society’s counter response saw an
exponential increase in civilian participation, some of whom chose to arm themselves. As
established, most conflict today involves a non-state actor. However, the designation of
non-state actor does not always follow a neat algorithm. The Libya/NTC conflict
highlights this issue, and is important because segments of civil society quickly joined the
armed group to create a council (the NTC) comprised mainly of civil society actors.
The resistance fighters gradually organized themselves into geographically
rooted militias (or kataeb), each led by a single military commander, who
was often recruited from the ranks of defectors from the national army.
Communication constraints prevailing in the early phase of the conflict
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prevented the kataeb from fusing into a unified military structure with a
single chain of command. 113
In essence, sectors of civil society became the armed non-state actor – the
National Transitional Council. By the first week of March, 2011, the National
Transitional Council had established itself as the principal coordinating group of the
rebelling factions. The Council was made up of a wide swath of civil society: activists,
lawyers, academics, former military, persons representing political prisoners,
businessmen, and its initial president was the first high ranking defector from the Qaddafi
regime, the Minister of Justice.114
The NTC was complemented by a military council set up to coordinate
armed activities that oversaw at least some of the opposition troops. As the
conflict progressed, the NTC affirmed its commitment to International
Humanitarian Law [IHL] by issuing ‘codes of conduct’ on the treatment of
detainees and prisoners, and a frontline manual on the fundamental rules
of IHL. 115
Thus, as a non-state actor comprised of segments of Libyan civil society, the NTC
was able to influence the behavior of its members through norm diffusion. The “rules of
conflict” were disseminated among the thuwar both verbally and in print. Further, the
Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Libya determined that the
organization of the thuwar and the intensity of the violence gave rise to a noninternational armed conflict which triggered the application of international humanitarian
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law, and more specifically Protocol II and Common Article 3. On March 19, 2011, an
international coalition joined the conflict and began employing force through aerial
targeted bombing to enforce Resolution 1973. Because of this, the Commission found
that the necessary elements of an international armed conflict had also been fulfilled. The
Commission further concluded that this was legally separate from the non-international
armed conflict, and was thus a “co-existing international armed conflict.” 116 The
terminology concerning the Libyan conflict is important both legally and academically.
The determination of co-existing conflicts holds all parties accountable: the government
of Libya as a signatory to various treaties and conventions; NATO as an “instrument” of
the United Nations in this context, and the NTC as a non-state party to an armed conflict
that if it were to receive formal recognition, would want to be viewed as observant of
common international humanitarian standards.
NGOs played a role in mitigating civilian casualties both during the active phase
of the conflict, and its aftermath. As early as April of 2011, three Libyan experts began
conducting workshops in Eastern Libya to help community leaders build civil capacity,
reaching over one hundred eighty participants. The core training revolved around how to
effectively plan, implement and monitor relief and development programs. The NTC had
recently established a committee to oversee humanitarian activities, and civil society was
beginning to organize its response regarding the effects of the armed conflict on a civilian
population, as well as its hopes for the future of Libya. NGO projects at this point tended
to focus on emergency relief, and assistance for displaced persons.117 As the war
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progressed, NGOs active both inside and outside Libya began to fill the civil vacuum.
The New Libya Foundation is one such group, and was founded very early on in the
conflict (February 25, 2011). Its mission is to “nurture the successful development of
civil society organizations in Libya through training, education, access to resources and
financial assistance. Our vision is broad with our immediate focus on: civic engagement,
inclusiveness, and association.” 118 The Foundation has also set up an “Incubator Center”
which organizes networking events for Libyan civil society to meet and interact with
government officials, international organizations, funders and other elites. This is
important because although the new Libya has a General National Congress comprised of
elected representatives, the bulk of the work and decision making regarding political life
comes from local councils. Sadat el-Badri, chairman of the Tripoli Local Council, says
that while he classifies his organization as "government" more than "civil society”, he
admits that seventy to eighty percent of the activity is done by NGOs. 119 As a fledgling
democracy, participation by civil society is essential. Without the rule of law, new
political structures, and a civil society empowered as a true stakeholder in the future of
Libya, the country could devolve back into conflict and chaos. NGOs serve an important
role in moving forward. Libyan Human Rights Solidarity and the World Organization
Against Torture (OMCT) are two such examples. Khaled Saleh, Secretary General of
the Libyan Human Rights Solidarity group visited the eastern city of Benghazi in August
of 2011. Although based in Switzerland, Saleh saw that:
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As an organization, it was important to be present and to work inside Libya
in order to promote the culture of human rights on the largest scale. At the
moment, we have an office in Benghazi that has started to organize
conferences and training courses to raise Libyans’ awareness about human
rights. We will organize the first training course for a group of lawyers,
jointly with the Cairo Institute for Human Rights. 120
Libyan Human Rights Solidarity was also actively involved in training rebels in
international humanitarian law, specifically the treatment of prisoners from Qaddafi’s
forces. Similarly, the World Organization Against Torture began its work in Libya in
1996, focusing on the maltreatment of prisoners. Since the 2011 revolution began, “it has
been accompanying civil society in fighting against torture and supporting legal reforms.”
121

More recently in 2013, the NGO organized the workshop Uniting Public Institutions

and Civil Society to Monitor and Implement the New Law Against Torture: Challenges
and Prospects. The workshop was in response to the Libyan General National Council
passing new laws forbidding the use of torture and prohibiting forced disappearances,
common practices during the Qaddafi regime.
Lastly, the well-known international non-governmental organization ACTED has
been operating in Libya since early 2012. Its main office is in Tripoli, although there are
thirty nine national and two international staff spread throughout the country. Two of
ACTED’s main projects are to “support the emergence and development of civil society
in Libya” and to “enhance the civil and political participation of youth in Libya.” 122
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Libyans under the age of forty have only ever known political life under a dictator.
Freedom of the press, freedom to assemble, and freedom of association are all nascent
concepts for two generations of Libyans. The advocacy and skill-based training provided
by ACTED and other NGOs not only help fill a void in political and civic life, they are a
barrier to a return to authoritarian rule.
As reflected in the discussion above, the role of civil society in Libya has been
more important post-conflict than during the seven months of actual heavy fighting.
During the active phase of armed conflict, top priority was placed on physical security,
and the link between civil society and decreasing civilian death was relatively weak.
Instead, civil society has been developing the vital capacity to reduce future conflict. As
stated prior, NGOs in Libya were not allowed to exist unless they were sponsored by a
member of Qaddafi’s family or political ally. Political parties were outlawed. Free speech
was nonexistent. Further, throughout Qaddafi’s forty year rule, there were no independent
human rights organizations or other civil society groups. 123 Since the end of the Libyan
conflict, thousands of NGOs have been formed, representing the interests of a wide swath
of Libyan civil society. These NGOs are necessary in their work to involve ordinary
Libyans in government institutions and decision making. In the aftermath of the
revolution, armed militias were the groups with the most influence over newly elected
public officials. Guns then held more sway than ballots. Currently, in 2014, armed
factions within Libya are still fighting each other, although the battle related death
threshold of twenty five has not been reached. NGOs play a vital role in tempering the
violence and providing alternatives to weapons as a means to settle dispute. Many NGOs
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working on governance, rule of law, and democratic ideals offer hope for an alternative
future. In this way, Libya is setting precedent for other post-conflict transitions involving
an armed non-state actor.
The 2011 situation in Libya further provided a test case of whether the United
Nations would be held accountable for its 2009 recommendations regarding protection of
civilians. Security Council Resolution 1973, passed on March 17, 2011 had the express
intent of protecting civilians. Its language clearly invoked the Responsibility to Protect
paradigm.
The Security Council … expressing grave concern at the deteriorating
situation, the escalation of violence, and the heavy civilian casualties,
Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the
Libyan population and reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts bear
the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the
protection of civilians, … Demands the immediate establishment of a
cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and
abuses of, civilians; 125
The frenzy of diplomacy and relative speed with which the UN passed Resolution
1973 in 2011 marked a stark departure from the inaction of the United Nations in
Rwanda in 1994. Widespread protests had begun in Libya in mid-February. Within a
month the international community acted, approving a no fly zone over Libya and
authorizing all necessary measures to protect civilians. Later in 2011 however, the
international community did not take similar decisive action in Syria, where armed
resistance groups were demanding the ouster of President Assad. Instead, the U.N.
Security Council deadlocked, and could not reach a unanimous vote regarding
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intervention. There were legitimate questions as to whether civilian protection was the
sole reason for international intervention in Libya, and critics alleged that the ouster of
Qaddafi was the true primary objective. In part because of the removal of a head of state
from power, Russia and China declined to authorize another U.N. Security Council
resolution permitting international involvement in Syria similar to Resolution 1973
concerning Libya.
The conflicts in Libya and Syria both started out as peaceful protests by civil
society. The estimated civilian death in Syria between March 2011 and April 2014 is now
more than 190,000 persons.126 From 2012-2014, the number of civilian deaths in Libya
did not meet the threshold mark of twenty five to be included in the Uppsala Conflict
Data Program. Scholars and policy decision makers continue to debate whether the swift
decision by the United Nations Security Council sanctioning international intervention in
Libya led to the relatively short lived armed conflict there. It is certain however that
ultimately, Libyan civilians were better protected, and through a variety of instruments:


the U.N. Security Council basing its intervention on principles contained
within the Responsibility to Protect paradigm



various sectors of civil society who then became the armed non-state actor
were made aware of international humanitarian law during armed conflict.
This gave the insurgency a legitimacy both within the civilian population
that they would be rightly protected if the ANSA did indeed seize power
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from state forces, and within the international community that the NTC
was a serious entity committed to basic humanitarian principles


the rise of non-governmental organizations, post-conflict, focused on
governance and rule of law in a country that previously had few to none.

The Libyan conflict, like most modern conflict, was a complex situation with
rapidly changing events. As the U.N. Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry
on Libya has documented, all actors within the conflict caused civilian death. However, it
was the National Transitional Council itself, as the ANSA, which allowed for the
opportunity for the creation of civil society groups and NGOs. Non-withstanding the
external pressure from the international community during war, ongoing pressure from
NGOs and civil society groups helped lead to internalization of the norm of civilian
protection in Libya.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Recommendations: Towards Better Protection of
Civilians

The vast majority of today’s armed conflicts involve at least one armed non-state
actor. Decreasing armed conflict and its pursuant harm to civilians is a common goal
shared by the global community. I argued in this thesis that any approach to decreasing
civilian death during armed conflict must thus include engaging non-state actors.
Civil society and international non-governmental organizations (I/NGOs) have a
unique and crucial role in influencing the behavior of a non-state actor. If the norm of
civilian protection is to be appropriately expanded to include conflicts involving armed
non-state actors, it is imperative that civil society actors, who have greater access and
fewer negotiating constraints than states, be treated as partners in the process of norm
expansion.
Civilian are less likely to die and more likely to be better protected physically
when an armed conflict is state – state. Conventions, international law, and the norm
expansion of protection guaranteed to civilians have all contributed to this positive
outcome since World War II. When the armed conflict involves a non-state actor,
however, civilians remain at higher risk for death. The challenge therefore is how to
expand the norm of civilian protection to encompass the behavior of armed non-state
actors (ANSAs).
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Civil society and international NGOs can assist in the process of norm expansion
to ANSAs. First, they have fewer constraints placed upon them than state actors. NGOs
have their own mission and by-laws. They are accountable to a board of directors or
similar entity, not a nation/state, nor government agency. Whereas the state may have the
publicly declared policy of non-negotiation with non-state actors (or substitute the nom
de guerre “terrorists”, “rebels”, or “insurgents” here), it may well be the explicit mission
and role of an international NGO to negotiate with the non-state actor – thereby relieving
the state from this function, and allowing a specialized NGO or specific sector of civil
society to take on this vital role instead. For example, in Colombia, “the President
officially appointed the Catholic Church as channel for negotiations with the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), despite this group's presence on [terror
watch] lists maintained by the United States and the EU. [Another example is the case of
third party mediators engaging in] regular talks with all sides of the Israeli–Palestinian
conflict, including Hamas.” 127
In this thesis, I focused on three case studies to test the hypothesis that civil
society and NGOs are necessary interlocutors in conflict involving a non-state actor.
Civil society assists in expanding the norm of civilian protection in a variety of ways,
access to ANSAs and fewer negotiating constraints being two of the most crucial. Each
of the case studies below clearly illustrates the role that civil society and international
NGOs were able to take on because of decreased negotiating constraints:
1. In the conflict between Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), it
was civil society leaders who met directly with senior LRA representatives
127

Nicolas Florquin and Elisabeth Decrey Warner, “Engaging Non-State Armed Groups or Listing
Terrorists? Implications for the Arms Control Community,” Disarmament Forum, April (2008), 19.

80

to try to broker a peace agreement in 2008. This occurred after the Juba
peace process between the LRA and the Ugandan government collapsed.
2. In the Philippines, where successive administrations refused
communication with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), two
specialized INGOs are involved in negotiations and ceasefire monitoring.
Nonviolent Peaceforce is playing an active role in unarmed civilian
peacekeeping, and meets with representatives of all sides of the conflict to
discuss and review standards of international humanitarian law. The
second INGO, Geneva Call, is engaging ANSAs in two ways: negotiating
with ANSA leadership to become a signatory to the Deed of Commitment
for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for
Cooperation in Mine Action, and leading the de-mining efforts in the
Mindanau area.
3. The case study of the conflict between Libya and the National Transition
Council (NTC) is unique, but presents clear evidence for the role of civil
society in negotiations. Members of the Libyan government defected and
became de facto members of civil society. Ahmed Jibril, a Libyan
diplomat; Ibrahim Dabbashi, Libya’s ambassador to the United Nations;
and Moustafa Jalil, former Minister of Justice turned first head of the NTC
are three such examples. In my definition of civil society, I included
epistemic communities which can influence collective opinion. These
former governmental elites each went on to help negotiate an end to the
conflict by engaging with both the international community, and the
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National Transition Council; soliciting the former for political support and
assistance to end the fighting, and influencing the latter to uphold
humanitarian law.
The second crucial manner in which civil society and international NGOs assist in
the process of norm expansion to ANSAs is through access. INGOs have entrée to the
non-state actor not always granted to states or their representatives. Some NGOs are
already an established presence in the geographical area of conflict. They may have an
existing relationship with the ANSA, or members of the ANSA, that precedes the armed
conflict. Other NGOs rely on their reputation to gain entre’, such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross. Still other NGOs have a specialized service or skillset that
the ANSA may see as desirable. All the above qualities can open the door to
communication, build trust, and improve access, as illustrated in the case studies below:
1. In the conflict between Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA),
civil society and Ugandan NGOs had access to the LRA because they live
and work in the communities most affected. Civil society is instrumental
in tracking LRA movement and attacks, and reporting this information via
radio to authorities and neighboring communities to prevent further
civilian harm. The INGO Kony 2012 was instrumental in building the
infrastructure necessary for radio communications. Additionally, several
Ugandan NGOs fill the role of assisting former LRA soldiers to
demobilize and reintegrate within their communities.
2. In the Philippines, the INGOs Nonviolent Peaceforce and Geneva Call
both gained access to the MILF over time and by gaining trust. Both
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organizations are committed to neutrality and nonpartisanship within the
conflict, exhibiting these values over the test of time. Further, both groups
had national and international staff; the national staff are known members
of the community who were vested in ending the conflict within their own
community, and international staff enhance impartiality.
3. The case study of the conflict between Libya and the National Transition
Council (NTC) is again unique because the armed non-state actor arose
from civil society. Of the members of any given Libyan community, some
chose to take up arms, others chose to start NGOs. They had access to
each other because they knew, worked and lived with each other under
Qaddafi’s rule. Organizations such as Libyan Human Rights Solidarity
and the World Organization Against Torture trained and worked with the
opposition forces regarding humanitarian law. Hundreds of other NGOs
formed once the NTC made clear that the formation of Libyan NGOs
would be welcomed; many of them focusing on governance and rule of
law.
On the other hand, international “terrorist blacklists” can limit civil society and
I/NGO access to an ANSA. The inclusion of an individual or an organization on an
international watch list is often not a transparent process, and thus open to political
influence. There are also no “gradations” within lists, which can lead to confusion, and
can be counterproductive in two ways. First, INGOs functioning as interlocutors with an
armed non-state actor may find their funding from states and other organizations in
jeopardy. Second, ANSAs which may have renounced arms, and which may be the very
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groups likely to engage in negotiations, are treated in the same way as groups
perpetrating active campaigns of terror. The Iranian opposition group, the People's
Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) provides one such example. They sought to be
removed from European terror watch lists for years. Despite evidence that the group had
ceased military action since 2001, and rulings in favor of the PMOI by both the Court of
First Instance of the European Communities and the Proscribed Organisations Appeal
Commission, the listing stood until 2009 for the EU, and 2012 for the United States. 128
Caution should be taken with regard to the prohibition of engaging or interacting with
ANSAs. This can lead to entrenched positions, exacerbate the conflict at hand, and
ultimately lead to more civilian harm, which was especially true in the case study of the
Philippine / MILF conflict. Lack of access also blocks the dissemination of norms that
promote civilian protection.
Civil society and NGOs play a further role in resolving armed conflict because
they generally lack an agenda other than an end to that conflict and decrease in civilian
harm. A state’s foremost responsibility is the security of its citizens, but competing
interests may interfere with that obligation. Similarly, armed non-state actors rarely have
civilian protection as the sole reason for the formation of their group. For example, the
African National Congress was formed to fight against apartheid policies, which in
essence would help protect black citizens, but its formation was not solely for the
protection of civilians. Organized parties do not take up arms exclusively to protect
civilians from arms. The state and/or non-state actor in any armed conflict usually has
other interests, whether that be political power, territory, or economic gain. The agenda
of a neutral third party in an armed conflict, whether civil society or an INGO, is
128
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altruism: that of assisting in norm diffusion and preventing civilian harm. Therefore, it is
critical that the NGO be viewed as impartial and objective. “The perceived independence
of INGOs from the control of other entities, particularly national governments, often
increases their credibility among armed actors.” 129 In the three case studies, all of the
NGOs and sectors of civil society highlighted took great care to put civilian protection as
their primary objective. They may each have a unique mission, whether it is de-mining
efforts or reintegrating child soldiers, but the end goal is common – decreased civilian
harm.
In spite of their contributions, NGOs also have attributes in need of improvement
in order to increase their effectiveness. Civil society and I/NGOs have no “legal”
authority to make decisions, or enforce decisions once agreed upon. This lack of
authority is a double edged sword. Lack of legal authority can devalue the role of
I/NGOs, and make it more difficult to entice engagement with the ANSA. However, lack
of legal authority can potentially enhance the moral authority of I/NGOs, as moral
authority relies on altruism in its origin, and not external directives. An example is the
Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for
Cooperation in Mine Action, conceived by the INGO Geneva Call. There are no legal
ramifications for an ANSA if it does not sign onto the Commitment. Geneva Call cannot
ban them from international organizations. Nor will they likely be held accountable in the
Court of Justice. ANSAs understand that Geneva Call has no jurisdiction over their
behavior. They sign the Commitment because they recognize the altruism inherent in
Geneva Call’s endeavors, and want to increase their own moral authority within both the
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relevant civilian population and the global community by adhering to standards of
international humanitarian law.
Another challenge posed by the civilian protection work of I/NGOs is the issue of
personal or institutional ego. If the success or failure of negotiations is specifically tied to
one individual, or one organization, there exists the possibility that the success of the
individual or entity will override the success of the goal of civilian protection. Egos can
be a real barrier to negotiations. Situations where the norm of civilian protection
supersedes all else are preferable. The model posed by the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) is a good example. The names of the individuals involved in
negotiations or meetings are seldom made public, nor are the findings of the ICRC,
except in rare instances. The focus is always on all parties abiding by international
humanitarian law.
Two other issues are important to civil society and I/NGOs being treated as
partners in the process of norm expansion: trust and resources. It takes time to build trust
if the non-governmental organization is not well known to the various warring factions.
ANSAs may be suspicious of INGO personnel with whom they do not have a
relationship. Questions as to an NGO employee’s true identity and purpose may arise.
Conferring trust is a process that must be respected as impartiality, neutrality and
discretion are qualities integral to a relationship with ANSAs.
Lack of resources represents a significant challenge to the work of INGOs. If only
the global community allocated as many resources to those entities engaging in conflict
resolution and norm diffusion using non-military means, as those employing the military.
During fiscal year 2012, the United States Department of Defense budget (not including
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Iraq/Afghanistan wars) amounted to more than 500 billion USD,130 compared to 2.78
million USD operational expenditures for Geneva Call. 131 More funding for
organizations that do the concrete work of conflict resolution and norm diffusion is
imperative. An increase in financial support can: train mediators, place more aid workers
on the ground educating ANSAs and increasing awareness of international humanitarian
law, support unarmed peacekeeping, purchase hand held radios, radio towers and
communication capabilities, fund de-radicalization and de-mining programs; as well as
the many other ways civil society and INGOs strategically adapt to each armed conflict in
order to enhance civilian protection.
Civil society and INGOs play a unique and crucial role in influencing the
behavior of a non-state actor. “Governments, international organizations and NGOs
should thus not squander the opportunity of integrating NSAs into international law...
Instead, it seems promising to keep communications channels open, in order to convince
NSAs of the necessity of maintaining civil rights standards. Neither the exclusion of these
actors nor their demonization can bring an end to the suffering of the civilian population
– on the contrary.” 132 The resolve of the international community to adequately protect
civilians was put to the test after WWII. By and large, civilian death decreased in
state/state conflict. The resolve of the international community is again being tested; this
time concerning conflict that includes a non-state actor. My hypothesis demonstrates that
to expand the norm of civilian protection to include conflicts involving armed non-state
130
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actors, civil society and NGOs must be treated as partners in the process of norm
expansion.
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